Prisbrey, Jeffrey E. (1992) An Experimental Analysis of Two-Person Reciprocity Games. Social Science Working Paper, 787. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-162254700
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Abstract
This paper presents experimental evidence concerned with behavior in one-shot, finite repetition, and infinite repetition, two-person Reciprocity Games. Both symmetric and asymmetric games as well as games with explicit punishment actions are studied and compared. Along with classifying the group outcomes to the games, individual strategies are classified. The importance of alternation or turn-taking, group welfare, and equality as focal solutions is examined. Also considered is whether or not outcomes are unique, Pareto Optimal, or individually rational, and whether or not finite repetition treatments are subject to end-game effects.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | This paper has benefited from the comments of Charles Plott, Roy Gardner, Howard Rosenthal and especially Thomas Palfrey. I would also like to thank the participants at the Economic Science Association '91 Fall Meetings and the faculty of the California Institute of Technology, both of whom commented on an early draft. The financial support of the California Institute of Technology and the Haynes Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. | ||||||
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
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| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 787 | ||||||
| Classification Code: | JEL: 026, 215 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-162254700 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-162254700 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 80939 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 30 Aug 2017 16:58 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:36 |
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