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Subjective games and equilibria

Kalai, Ehud and Lehrer, Ehud (1995) Subjective games and equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, 8 (1). pp. 123-163. ISSN 0899-8256. doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80019-3.

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Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian, and correlated equilibria to the analysis of strategic interaction requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. The proposed notions of subjective games and of subjective Nash and correlated equilibria replace essential but unavailable objective knowledge by subjective assessments. When playing a subjective game repeatedly, subjective optimizers converge to a subjective equilibrium. We apply this approach to some well known examples including single- and multi-person, multi-arm bandit games and repeated Cournot oligopoly games.

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Additional Information:© 1995 Elsevier Inc. Received 29 November 1993. The authors acknowledge valuable communications with Andreas Blume, Eddie Dekel-Tabak, Itzhak Gilboa, David Kreps, Sylvain Sorin, as well as participants in the 1993 Summer in Tel Aviv Workshop and in seminars at the University of California, San Diego; the California Institute of Technology; and the University of Chicago. The research was supported by NSF Economics Grants SES-9022305 and SBR-9223156 and by the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences of the California Institute of Technology. This paper is an extended version of “Bounded Learning Leads to Correlated Equilibrium” (see Kalai and Lehrer, 1991).
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Issue or Number:1
Classification Code:JEL: C73, C83
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-082626610
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Official Citation:Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer, Subjective games and equilibria, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 8, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 123-163, ISSN 0899-8256, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80945
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 16:56
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:39

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