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Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms

Ledyard, John O. and Porter, David and Rangel, Antonio (1997) Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6 (3). pp. 639-675. ISSN 1058-6407. doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00639.x.

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This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction over a variety of demand conditions. In test environments created to check only the minimum competency of the procedures, the simultaneous discrete auction process produces highly efficient allocations, approaching levels similar to those found with a continuous form of the auction, and it outperforms a sequential auction. However, in environments created to stress test the procedures, a combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous discrete auction.

Item Type:Article
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Alternate Title:The Results of Some Tests of Mechanism Designs for the Allocation and Pricing of Collections of Heterogeneous Items
Additional Information:© 1997 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-083453392
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Official Citation:Ledyard, J. O., Porter, D. and Rangel, A. (1997), Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 6: 639–675. doi:10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00639.x
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80947
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 16:54
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:39

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