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Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments

Pápai, Szilvia (2001) Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 3 (3). pp. 257-271. ISSN 1097-3923. doi:10.1111/1097-3923.00066.

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We consider the allocation of heterogeneous indivisible objects without using monetary transfers. Each agent may be assigned more than one object. We show that an allocation rule is strategyproof, nonbossy, and satisfies citizen sovereignty if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. In a sequential dictatorship agents are assigned their favorite objects that are still available, according to a sequentially endogenously determined hierarchy of the agents. We also establish that replacing nonbossiness by a stronger criterion restricts the characterized class of allocation rules to serial dictatorships, in which the hierarchy of the agents is fixed a priori.

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Alternate Title:Strategyproof and Nonbossy Assignments
Additional Information:© 2001 Blackwell Publishers, Inc. Received November 1998; Accepted April 2000. I thank Kim Border, Tom Palfrey, Simon Wilkie, and especially John Ledyard for helpful comments. Support from a Sloan Dissertation Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.
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Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-084355622
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Official Citation:Pápai, S. (2001), Strategyproof and Nonbossy Multiple Assignments. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 3: 257–271. doi:10.1111/1097-3923.00066
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80948
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 16:05
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:39

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