Keech, William R. (1992) Rules, Discretion, and Accountability in Macroeconomic Policymaking. Governance, 5 (3). pp. 259-278. ISSN 0952-1895. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.1992.tb00040.x. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-104904803
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Abstract
Arguments for rules rather than discretion in macroeconomic policymaking facilitate the understanding of some fundamental issues of democratic theory. This article reviews four such arguments, and relates them to issues of delegation and accountability in representative government.
| Item Type: | Article | ||||||||||||
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| Additional Information: | © 1992 Wiley. | ||||||||||||
| Issue or Number: | 3 | ||||||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.1468-0491.1992.tb00040.x | ||||||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-104904803 | ||||||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-104904803 | ||||||||||||
| Official Citation: | KEECH, W. R. (1992), Rules, Discretion, and Accountability in Macroeconomic Policymaking. Governance, 5: 259–278. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.1992.tb00040.x | ||||||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||
| ID Code: | 80955 | ||||||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||
| Deposited By: | Tony Diaz | ||||||||||||
| Deposited On: | 30 Aug 2017 17:54 | ||||||||||||
| Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2021 19:40 |
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