Chen, Yan and Ordeshook, Peter C. (1994) Constitutional secession clauses. Constitutional Political Economy, 5 (1). pp. 45-60. ISSN 1043-4062. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-125508372
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Abstract
Taking the view that constitutions are devices whereby people coordinate to specific equilibria in circumstances that allow multiple equilibria, we show that a constitutional secession clause can serve as such a device and, therefore, that such a clause is more than an empty promise or an ineffectual threat. Employing a simple three-person recursive game, we establish that under certain conditions, this game possesses two equilibria—one in which a disadvantaged federal unit secedes and is not punished by the other units in the federation, and a second equilibrium in which this unit does not secede but is punished if it chooses to do so.
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Additional Information: | © 1994 George Mason University. This research was partially funded by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace at the California Institute of Technology. We wish to thank several anonymous referees who brought to our attention a number of things that we had not previously considered. | ||||||||||||
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Issue or Number: | 1 | ||||||||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-125508372 | ||||||||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-125508372 | ||||||||||||
Official Citation: | Chen, Y. & Ordeshook, P.C. Constit Polit Econ (1994) 5: 45. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02393255 | ||||||||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||
ID Code: | 80961 | ||||||||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||
Deposited By: | Tony Diaz | ||||||||||||
Deposited On: | 30 Aug 2017 20:36 | ||||||||||||
Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:37 |
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