CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Designing organizations for trading pollution rights

Ledyard, John O. and Szakaly-Moore, Kristin (1994) Designing organizations for trading pollution rights. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 25 (2). pp. 167-196. ISSN 0167-2681. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-130149209

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-130149209

Abstract

Regulators and academicians have recently become interested in using a marketable permits program as a new way to control aggregate pollution emissions. Our research focuses on choosing a permit trading mechanism that is both economically efficient and politically viable. We consider an organized trading process and a revenue neutral auction, both of which involve an initial allocation of permits based on past history. Each is tested in a competitive and in a non-competitive environment to determine which mechanism performs best. The results of our research suggest that, overall, the organized trading process outperforms the revenue neutral auction.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(94)90009-4DOIArticle
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0167268194900094PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170825-143301240Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1994 Elsevier B.V. We would like to thank the Flight Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Lab (NASA) for financial support through their grant to the Program on Organization Design at Caltech. This is one of a number of studies on the transition from non-market allocation to market-like allocation mechanisms. We would also like to thank Jamie Kruse, Linda Cohen, and two anonymous referees for their comments.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
JPLUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:2
Classification Code:JEL: 215; 722
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-130149209
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-130149209
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80962
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 20:34
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:37

Repository Staff Only: item control page