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Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1992) Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study. Social Science Working Paper, 785. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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An experiment was conducted to test whether discounted repeated play leads to greater cooperation and coordination than one-shot play, in a public good environment with incomplete information. The experiment was designed so that, theoretically repeated play can sustain equilibria with higher group earnings than result in the one-shot Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The design varied a number of environment al parameters, including the size of the group, the marginal rate of transformation between the public and private good, and the statistical distribution of marginal rates of substitution between the public and private good. Marginal rates of substitution were private information but the statistical distribution was common knowledge. The results indicate that repetition leads to greater cooperation, and that the magnitude of these gains depends both on the ability of players to monitor each other's strategy and on the underlying environmental parameters.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:The authors are thankful for the research support of the National Science Foundation through grants #SES-8718650 and #SES-9011828. The research assistance of Mark Fey, Jessica Goodfellow, and Jeff Prisbrey is gratefully acknowledged for their help in conducting the experiments. Sanjay Srivastava was instrumental in developing the computer network used for the experiments. Work on this paper proceeded while Rosenthal was a Fellow at the International Centre for Economic Research and a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Science. He is grateful for financial support provided by National Science Foundation #BNS-8700864 during his stay at CASBS.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Subject Keywords:Repeated Games, Experiments, Public Goods, Bayesian Games
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:785
Classification Code:JEL: 026, 215
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-132920230
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80966
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 20:42
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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