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Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results

Boylan, Richard T. and Ledyard, John and McKelvey, Richard D. (1996) Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results. Economic Theory, 7 (2). pp. 191-205. ISSN 0938-2259. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-141350613

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Abstract

We analyze the role of political competition on the type of economic policies that are selected in a one sector model of economic growth. We identify conditions under which neoclassical optimal growth plans occur, and conditions in which political business cycles occur. We find that the ability commit to multiperiod economic policy leads to less political stability of economic plans.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213902DOIArticle
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01213902PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-135904085Related ItemWorking Paper
Alternate Title:Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results
Additional Information:© 1996 Springer-Verlag. Received: November 2, 1994. Support for this research was provided in part by NSF grant #SES-9022932 to the California Institute of Technology. We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that our results could be extended to supra majority rules, as in Proposition 1.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-9022932
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-141350613
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-141350613
Official Citation:Boylan, R.T., Ledyard, J. & McKelvey, R.D. Econ Theory (1996) 7: 191. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213902
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80980
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 21:24
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:37

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