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Some Properties of Hare Voting with Strategic Voters

Ordeshook, Peter C. and Zeng, Langche (1991) Some Properties of Hare Voting with Strategic Voters. Social Science Working Paper, 772. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-145105291

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Abstract

This essay examines some properties of the Single Transferable Vote (Hare Voting) procedure for electing candidates in multi-member districts under the assumption that all voters are strategic. From the perspective of the most common criterion for evaluating voting procedures - the extent to which they ensure the eventual selection of Condorcet winning candidates - the results we offer in this essay can be interpreted as indictments of STY. Even if we restrict preferences by imposing conditions on attitudes towards risk and assume a strong form of separability, STY is not necessarily incentive compatible and strategic voting does not ensure the selection of Condorcet winning candidates or of Condorcet outcomes. This fact, moreover is not dependent on the existence of "bogus" equilibria - outcomes that exclude Condorcet candidates cannot be avoided under all circumstances even if we limit our analysis to strong or to individually stable equilibria.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-153035373Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:Published as Ordeshook, Peter C., and Langche Zeng. "Some properties of hare voting with strategic voters." Public Choice 78, no. 1 (1994): 87-101.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:772
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-145105291
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-145105291
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80988
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 22:06
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:37

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