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The rise of interlocking directorates in imperial Germany

Fohlin, Caroline (1999) The rise of interlocking directorates in imperial Germany. Economic History Review, 52 (2). pp. 307-333. ISSN 0013-0117. doi:10.1111/1468-0289.00127. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-145758177

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Abstract

Bankers are thought by many to have played an important role as entrepreneurs and overseers in German industrialization, identifying promising new industries and investments, offering managerial advice to their client firms, and monitoring the use of investment funds. The German joint-stock credit banks were, in Gerschenkron’s words, the ‘paragon of the type of the universal bank’. In the writings of Hilferding, Riesser, Jeidels, Wallich, and, more recently, Gerschenkron, the idea has persisted that German universal banks fostered close, long-term relationships with industry and that these associations facilitated a hands-on style of financing. Gerschenkron, among others, claimed that ‘the German banks, and with them the Austrian and Italian banks, established the closest possible relations with industrial enterprises’.


Item Type:Article
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0289.00127DOIArticle
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-0289.00127/abstractPublisherArticle
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Fohlin, Caroline0000-0002-1380-2788
Additional Information:© 1999 Economic History Society. Published by Blackwell Publishers. Issue online: 22 January 2003; Version of record online: 22 January 2003. The author thanks Michael Alvarez, Lance Davis, Barry Eichengreen, Harold James, Morgan Kousser, John Latting, Richard Tilly, and anonymous referees, as well as EHA conference participants for their comments. Funding from the US National Science Foundation, the Fulbright Commission, the Economic History Association, the Center for German and European Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, as well as the Joint Committee on Western Europe of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council (with funds provided by the Ford and Mellon Foundations) is grateful acknowledged.
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFUNSPECIFIED
Fulbright CommissionUNSPECIFIED
Economic History AssociationUNSPECIFIED
University of California, BerkeleyUNSPECIFIED
American Council of Learned SocietiesUNSPECIFIED
Social Science Research CouncilUNSPECIFIED
Ford FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Andrew W. Mellon FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Issue or Number:2
DOI:10.1111/1468-0289.00127
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-145758177
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-145758177
Official Citation:Fohlin, C. (1999), The rise of interlocking directorates in imperial Germany. The Economic History Review, 52: 307–333. doi:10.1111/1468-0289.00127
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80989
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 22:10
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:40

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