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On the Anatomy of the Nonfacilitating Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets

Clauser, Laura and Plott, Charles R. (1991) On the Anatomy of the Nonfacilitating Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets. Social Science Working Paper, 771. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-145952144

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Abstract

Effective conspiracies are more easily formed in posted-offer and in' sealed bid markets than in double auction markets. A feature of double auctions is isolated as the possible source of the behavioral differences. The double auction presents conspirators with continuous temptations to defect. It also fosters additional competition among sellers for access to buyers caused by the New York rule that requires that only the (first) best offers are exposed to the market and can be replaced only by better offers. This second competition can be interpreted as a coordination problem for volume allocation which could interact with other features of the process to undermine conspiracy. The research demonstrates that the continuous temptation to defect feature has its own independent influence which can account for observed differences.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:The research support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Laboratory of Experiments in Economics and Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Clauser, Laura and Plott, Charles R. (1992) On the Anatomy of the "Nonfacilitating" Features of the Double Auction Institution in Conspiratorial Markets. In: The double auction market: institutions, theories, and evidence. Proceedings volume in the Santa Fe Institute studies in the sciences of complexity. No.14. Addison-Wesley , Reading, MA, pp. 333-353.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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NSFUNSPECIFIED
Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political ScienceUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:771
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-145952144
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-145952144
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:80990
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:30 Aug 2017 22:20
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:37

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