Border, Kim C. and Segal, Uzi (1997) Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 65 (1). pp. 1-18. ISSN 0012-9682. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-160727267
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Abstract
There are several solutions to the Nash bargaining problem in the literature. Since various authors have expressed preferences for one solution over another, we find it useful to study preferences over solutions in their own right. We identify a set of appealing axioms on such preferences that lead to unanimity in the choice of solution, which turns out to be the solution of Nash.
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| Additional Information: | © 1997 The Econometric Society. We gratefully acknowledge stimulating suggestions from Larry Epstein, Peter Eso, Itzhak Gilboa, Ehud Kalai, Edi Karni, Bart Lipman, Joe Ostroy, Bob Pollak, Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra, Lloyd Shapley, Joel Sobel, Dan Vincent, Bill Weiss, Bill Zame, the co-editor, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Caltech, Johns Hopkins, Northwestern, and Washington University. Uzi Segal also thanks the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support. | ||||||||||||
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| Subject Keywords: | Arbitration, Ambivalence, Utility functions, Lotteries, Fairness, Game theory, Mathematical monotonicity, Axioms, Social choice, Games | ||||||||||||
| Issue or Number: | 1 | ||||||||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-160727267 | ||||||||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170830-160727267 | ||||||||||||
| Official Citation: | Border, Kim C., and Uzi Segal. “Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica, vol. 65, no. 1, 1997, pp. 1–18. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2171811 | ||||||||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||||||||
| ID Code: | 81002 | ||||||||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||||||||
| Deposited By: | Tony Diaz | ||||||||||||
| Deposited On: | 30 Aug 2017 23:58 | ||||||||||||
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:37 |
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