


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## THE FRENCH RURAL COMMUNIST ELECTORATE IN THE 1920S AND 1930S

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One of the original characteristics of French communism has been its durable strength in *some* rural areas ever since its foundation at the December 1920 *Congrès de Tours*. Over the past six decades, the Communists have found strong support not only in certain urban, industrial areas but in some of the more rural and backward areas of the country as well. The Communist party's implantation in the countryside - both in terms of militants and voters - has been concentrated among a number of departments along the northern and western edge of the Massif Central, and along the Mediterranean littoral. The first time the Communists were up for national office - in 1924 - they scored best not in an urban department but in the overwhelmingly rural Lot-et-Garonne (south-east of Bordeaux) where they gathered over 30% of the valid votes cast. Eight of the eighteen departments where they did best in that year were predominantly rural. By 1936 the Party's strength in rural areas had increased notably. The Communists received over 20% of the vote in sixteen departments, nine of which can hardly be considered industrial, and in three of these over 60% of the active population was engaged in agriculture. During the interwar years it is estimated that 15% of the Party's members belonged to the agricultural professions.<sup>1</sup> The question which springs to mind, then, is why the Communists have done so well (and continued to do so in the 1980s during a period of vertiginous electoral decline) in rural departments which hardly correspond, from a sociological perspective, to the image one has of the *parti de la classe ouvrière*?

The Communist party's rural implantation has largely been ignored by historians and political scientists alike. Primarily interested in the relationship between the Party and the working class (or barring that, the intellectuals), historians of French communism, joined by those interested in the French peasantry, have uncritically accepted the standard - though rarely substantiated - explanation of why rural voters casts their ballots for the Communist party. The Communist party's strong showing in certain rural regions (such as the Limousin and the Dordogne, which I will discuss here) has usually been attributed to the existence of a long-standing leftist political tradition or a *tradition démocratique très avancée*.<sup>2</sup> According to this

explanation, successive generations of voters in the countryside, determined to vote as far left as possible, cast their ballots in logical succession *toujours plus à gauche* (always further on the Left) - starting with the *démocrates-socialistes* in 1849, then moving on to the Radicals, the Socialists in the first decades of the century, and, last but not least, the Communists after 1920.

This line of argument was first proposed in the early twenties by Daniel Halévy in his classic book on rural life in central France.<sup>3</sup> It was later developed and popularized by Ernest Labrousse, and in particular by François Goguel in a series of influential works on French electoral geography.<sup>4</sup> Attempting to explain Communist successes in the 1946 Corrèze, Goguel argued that communism "purely and simply succeeded Ledru-Rollin's Mountain. It owes its strength to the fact that it is "the furthest on the Left" of French parties, the successor of socialism twenty years ago and radicalism fifty years ago..."<sup>5</sup> This explanation was extended by Goguel, and other leading observers of French political life, to all rural regions where the Party scored well at the polls.<sup>6</sup> Rural communism, in short, was the outgrowth of an old republican tradition, and was nothing but "an old bottle, with a new label;" the contents remained unchanged.<sup>7</sup>

The tradition argument, based on the haphazard visual correlations characteristic of much of French electoral geography, poses more far more problems than it actually solves. It is telling that tradition been forwarded as *the* explanation of Communist voting only in those areas where the presence of an industrialized working class cannot be invoked as constituting the basis of Communist party support.<sup>8</sup> Tradition may well be a central component of the electorate's choice in some regions, but this is difficult to prove. Moreover, the proponents of the *tradition de gauche* interpretation fail to provide any convincing explanation of why large numbers of peasants, sharecroppers, tenant farmers, artisans, shopkeepers, and rural workers *never* moved beyond support for the *Radicaux Socialistes* (and their allies), while others cast their ballots in favor of Socialist and Communist candidates. What differentiated rural voters who backed the Communist party from those who did not? And what evidence can be forwarded to suggest that rural communism indeed did hark back to *démoc-soc* and Radical roots? By using the murky category of tradition to explain rural political behavior, observers have devaluated Communist (and Socialist) voting in the countryside. Voters, they imply, backed leftist parties more out of habit than to express support for a particular social, political, and ideological agenda. In their eyes, rural communism was little more than a radicalized version of Radicalism.

Historians and political scientists, who have investigated the Party's social bases of support in great detail in urban areas, have all but ignored it in the countryside. More often than not, the general consensus has been that if workers vote for the Communist party, they do

so because of their position as workers. When rural dwellers do so, however, their motives (or so it is suggested) are clearly less related to their broader position within society.<sup>9</sup> Those observers who have gone beyond the standard leftist tradition argument and ventured estimates of the social composition of the rural communist electorate have argued that it varied greatly within regions, and that alongside small-holding peasants the Party found support from a variety of occupational groups in the countryside. Jacques Girault, writing on the Var in the 1930s, finds that the presence of workers favored the Party's implantation; in certain cantons Communists captured substantial support among cultivators while in other areas their supporters tended to be wine-growers.<sup>10</sup> Michel Cadé's recent work on the Pyrénées-Orientales suggests the Party's rural electorate was composed largely of rural workers (miners, textile-workers), "peasant-workers", as well as small property owners and agricultural workers in wine growing areas.<sup>11</sup> A study of Communist strength in rural districts of the Puy-de-Dôme, where the Party was not particularly well established, concludes that temporary migrants and especially workers who lived in rural settings contributed decisively to Party support; the Party's electorate was also composed of peasants and, in some regions, agricultural workers.<sup>12</sup> Just to the north, in the Allier, Sally Sokoloff has proposed that contrary to common assumptions the bulk of the Party's backers at the polls was not composed of sharecroppers, but of small property owners and tenant farmers from the Montluçon area.<sup>13</sup> Finally, in a national overview of the years following the Second World War, Gordon Wright thought the Party found its staunchest rural supporters among farm laborers, marginal tenant farmers, and sharecroppers while also making inroads among small owners and "moderately prosperous small tenants"; at the same time, he suggested that a "considerable share" of the party's support came from small towns located in rural settings.<sup>14</sup>

These estimates of the Communist vote - however plausible some may appear - should be considered as hypotheses, based as they are on little verifiable evidence, and the authors in question often violate elementary methodological and statistical rules to reach their conclusions. It is well worth repeating that the Party's strength in communes and cantons with large numbers of peasant voters, for example, does not necessarily mean that it received support from that particular social group. Nor are visual correlations based on maps, graphs, or raw figures, a reliable method for examining the relationship between social structure and political preference.

The origins and composition of the rural Communist electorate merit more than superficial attention. Estimates of *who* Communist voters were, and who they supported in the past are key to gaining a clearer understanding of a rural Communist movement which in more ways than one was distinct from its urban counterpart. At a time when historians are less interested in broader questions concerning the French Communist party's purpose [*à quoi sert le*

*Parti communiste français? (PCF)],*<sup>15</sup> and more interested in determining, on the local level, *who* used the PCF and for what purpose they did so, this is an appropriate area of inquiry.<sup>16</sup> The French Communist movement was not a monolith, but had numerous regional and local variations, as leaders and militants adapted themselves to different social and economic circumstances - not to mention electoral clienteles. Examining the rural Communist electorate constitutes one of the most reliable, fruitful approaches to the study of one particular communism.

The analysis of rural communism, however, has relevance beyond the study of the PCF. Much excellent work has been undertaken of late on the complex relationship between French peasants and politics over the past two centuries.<sup>17</sup> While some of this work has transformed the way we think about politics in the countryside, the question of *how* rural dwellers actually cast their ballots has remained an intractable problem. The age-old puzzle of who voted for a specific party is a particularly vexing one, and the French school of electoral geography, with its cartographical penchant, is not particularly well suited to the task.<sup>18</sup> Scholars of rural France, not always aware of the ecological fallacy's existence, have often skated on thin ice when estimating the origins and social composition of a political party's electorate. And, as a result, one of the central questions for those interested in rural political behavior - how did peasants vote and how did their vote change over time? - remains largely unanswered.

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It is, however, possible to examine voting traditions and past electoral behavior without doing undue violence to the evidence, and I shall attempt to do so here for one of the Communist party's rural bastions during the interwar years: the Limousin (departments of the Corrèze, Creuse, Haute-Vienne) and the Dordogne. The Communists found strong support from the early twenties on in parts of these poor, isolated agricultural regions located on the southwestern edge of the Massif Central, where mixed farming (polyculture) and livestock raising remained the dominant activities.<sup>19</sup> The Communists were best implanted in the Corrèze - the subject of much of the following analysis - where their backing remained relatively stable, averaging 19.6% of the vote over the four interwar elections. Just to the north, in the Creuse, the Party's efforts never met with much consistent success and its support here was usually *lower* than in the nation as a whole. In the Dordogne, the Communist party hovered around the 13% mark in the twenties, lost support in 1932, before more than doubling its score to 22% of the vote - one of the better results in the nation - in the 1936 Popular Front elections. In the Haute-Vienne, the Communists' results see-sawed notably, but their strong showing in 1928 (21%) and to a lesser degree in 1936 (17.1%) demonstrated that they could be successful in this area when their local leadership presented more suitable candidates and policies.

These results were achieved within varying political contexts. The Creuse, Corrèze, and Dordogne remained areas of important - though steadily declining - Radical (in the broad sense of the term) influence. This decline was most apparent in the Creuse where the Radicals had been replaced by the Socialists as the department's dominant party by the early thirties. In the Corrèze, radicalism remained the principal political force until it nose-dived in 1936, and in the process it was overtaken by both socialism, which had grown consistently since 1928, and communism. In the Dordogne, on the other hand, the Radicals never gave up their leading position and together with centrist leaders dominated the local political landscape until the Popular Front elections. Support for the Right, already low by national standards, declined consistently in all three departments in the two decades following the First World War.

The Haute-Vienne, one of the Socialist party's bastions in France ever since 1910, constitutes a different case. Here the Socialists reigned supreme as early as 1914 when they obtained 55% of the vote and by 1919 the Radicals, who had obtained the backing of 42% of the voters only nine years earlier, had been eliminated from the political scene. The strength of socialism in the Haute-Vienne left little room for the center-left and this, in turn, may have contributed to the more notable presence of the interwar Right, although its score remained well under the nationwide average.

This region was thus characterized by the overwhelming and consistent strength of the Left. The period under study witnessed an important reordering in the ranking of political parties within the Left: broadly speaking, radicalism declined, while Socialists and Communists established themselves, though not always consistently nor simultaneously.

The following analysis of the Communist vote in the Limousin and the Dordogne has three broad objectives. First, through a correlational analysis of village-level electoral results I will draw a geographical profile of the Communist party's backing over time, and examine if indeed the Communists did benefit from a well-established *toujours plus à gauche* tradition. Second, I will turn to the technique known as ecological regression in order to estimate individual level voter behavior between successive elections in the Corrèze. How loyal were Communist voters to their Party? And who had they supported before the Communist party's foundation in December 1920? Finally, I will also use ecological regression to gauge the social basis of the Communist electorate in the interwar Corrèze and compare it to that of other parties.

Unless otherwise noted the electoral analysis is based on first round communal level results for nine legislative elections between 1898 and 1936. This data has been collected for all 760 villages, towns, and bourgs of the Corrèze, Creuse, and Haute-Vienne, as well as for the

Dordogne's forty seven cantons.<sup>20</sup> The results of the May 1849 legislative elections, which are only available by canton, have also been included in this analysis.<sup>21</sup>

## I

The central point that emerges from the detailed correlational analysis is the remarkable geographical continuity of the Communist vote throughout the Limousin and the Dordogne.<sup>22</sup> The correlations of the Party's electoral results for the interwar elections are, in the great majority of cases, far stronger than those of any other political party.<sup>23</sup> In the Corrèze, for example, the correlations of the Communist party's score on the communal level in pairs of successive elections grow consistently stronger over time, *never* dipping below .77 (PC1924-PC1928) and reaching the .84 mark for the 1932 and 1936 elections (table 1). This suggests that the Party benefited from similar geographical patterns of support throughout this entire period. By and large, the same communes backed the Party from election to election and they did so in the same relative order: communes which voted heavily for the Communists in 1924 would, in the majority of cases, tend to do so again in future elections, just as those that had failed to support communism would generally behave similarly in years to come. These notably strong correlations underline that changes in the Communist vote were not restricted to specific communes but were *across the board*, and this had clearly been the case since 1924 when the Party first presented itself before the electorate. Throughout the twenties and thirties the Party's communal geographical ordering of support remained roughly the same.

The principal characteristic of the Communist vote was its locational stability. The Party underwent no major electoral realignment during this period; on the contrary, its geographic base of support was continuously strengthened between successive elections. The long term correlations from 1924 on are remarkably consistent as well (PC1924-PC1932: .76; PC1924-PC1936: .72), thus clearly demonstrating that the Party was geographically stable in the short run (from election to election) as well as in the longer run (to see change between succeeding elections the correlation matrix should be read diagonally; the matrix should be consulted vertically to observe changes over the longer term). This distinguishes the Communists from opponents such as the Socialists and the Radicals who may have enjoyed moderate geographical continuity between consecutive elections, but who rarely did so over any lengthier time period (see tables 2 and 3).

The Communist party's geographical permanence was equally impressive in the neighboring Haute-Vienne, and this despite fluctuations in voter support both more important and frequent than in the Corrèze (table 4). In the Dordogne, the Party's geographical stability

at the cantonal level was not quite as consistent as it was in the Corrèze and the Haute-Vienne (table 5). Finally, in the Creuse, Communists were unable to secure a stable base of support in their early years. Only as of 1928 did the *Creusois* Communists achieve a notable degree of locational continuity, although the coefficients underline that this stability was somewhat weaker than in the rest of the Limousin (table 6).

The Communist vote throughout the Limousin and the Dordogne was characterized by an unusually high degree of electoral stability, and this distinguished it from its rivals. Major changes in the Communist party's line - such as the adoption of the class against class tactic in November 1927 - did not lead to notable alterations in the Party's implantation. The Party's territorial permanence was unaffected by variations - even important ones - in the percentage vote it received in legislative elections. Communist gains and losses were not confined to any particular region but were, on the contrary, relatively evenly spread out among all communes, and this regardless of how well or poorly the Party was implanted. No other political force in the interwar Limousin and Dordogne acquired such a solid, unchanging base of support in the first half of the twentieth-century, and no other party's electoral behavior bore such striking resemblance from one department to another. And none of the Party's opponents on the Left proved able to conserve their geographical base for any extended period of time. Only the ~~conservative parties succeeded in preserving their communal implantation in the short and intermediary term, but to a lesser degree than the Communist party.~~ The Communists were truly the Party of stability - a stability which constituted both the source of the Party's success and a major barrier to its development. The Communists preserved their zones of strength, but they met with great difficulty finding significant numbers of new supporters in areas where they were poorly established.

The origins of the Communist party's stable patterns of support can be traced back to pre-1920 socialism. In the Corrèze, the correlations of the SFIO (*Section française de l'internationale ouvrière*) vote between adjacent elections in the first two decades of the century are relatively strong (though not quite to the same degree as they would be for the Communists later on), suggesting that socialism, in its formative years in the Corrèze,<sup>24</sup> found a geographical base of support which it would preserve to a large extent before it was inherited and further strengthened by the Communists in the early twenties. Communes which voted Socialist in 1906, 1910, and 1914 (in whatever proportion) had a marked tendency to vote Communist early on, although this relationship had clearly weakened by the early thirties. The Socialist vote in 1914 is more highly correlated with the Communist one in 1928 (PS1914-PC1928: .61) than with any other election, including voting for the Socialist party in 1919 (table 1). In short, those



communes which supported the Socialists before the First World War did not tend in the least to do so in the post-1920 period. Instead, they turned to communism.

The results are even more significant for the 1919 elections when SFIO candidates were on the ballot in every Corrèze town and village: communes voting for the Socialists in that year are an *excellent* predictor of those that would support the Communists throughout the twenties and thirties. Areas of pre-War Socialist strength became regions where the Communists were rather well implanted (and this in the same general ordering of communes), just as areas of Socialist weakness remained that way for the Communists.<sup>25</sup> In both the Corrèze and the Dordogne (table 5), the Communist party stepped right in the shoes of the pre-1920 SFIO leaving the Socialist party in the difficult position of having to carve out, in the long term, a new geographical and thus political base for itself. In the twenties and thirties it was the Communists who were the heirs - geographically speaking at least - of the pre-1920 Socialist party, and on this level they were right on target when they claimed to be the sole continuators of the Socialist tradition.

A largely similar situation prevailed in the Haute-Vienne. Here as well communism became an electoral tradition. And yet the political situation in this department hardly resembled that of its south-eastern neighbor. The Socialist party was by far the most powerful political force in the Haute-Vienne, dominating key aspects of political life. The Communists, in the minority within the SFIO Federation at the time of the Tours Congress (which gave birth to the Communist party), found themselves unable to make up the ground they had lost at the start, and were relegated to playing second fiddle to the Socialists throughout the twenties and thirties. Despite the unequal relationship between the two major forces on the Left, it was the Communists who, by the late twenties, succeeded in appropriating the better part of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Socialist geographical base (table 4). In the bordering Creuse there was also a slight time lag before the Communists proved able to assume the geographical heritage of old Socialist party (table 6).

The Communist vote in the Limousin and the Dordogne was thus strongly associated with the Socialist vote in 1898 (Haute-Vienne), 1906 (Corrèze), 1910, 1914, and 1919, although the strength of this relationship varied between departments. Faced with widely diverging political situations in all four departments, the Communists successfully managed, in each case, to preserve and enlarge the territorial base of the old Socialist party.

The final question which the correlational analysis can resolve is whether communism was, from an electoral perspective, somewhat of a "new" phenomenon which can be traced, at most, back to pre-War socialism, or if its geographical roots lie further back in time. In other

words was communism, as the proponents of the *toujours plus à gauche* theory have argued, the end point of a long-standing leftist voting tradition in the countryside which began with the *démocrates-socialistes* in 1849?

Communism in the Corrèze does not seem to have taken on the geographical succession of the Mountain in any significant fashion. The correlations between the *démoc-socs*, the Socialist (as of 1906), and Communist vote fail to reveal any sustained relationship (see table 7).<sup>26</sup> Support for the *démocrates-socialistes* was at best a fair predictor of future (75 years later) voting for the Communist party. Only in 1924 ( $r=.29$ ) and 1936 ( $r=.22$ ) was there a slight similarity between the cantonal ordering of Montagnard and Communist strength. When the *démocrate-socialiste* geographical heritage *did* filter down to the twentieth-century it was not canalized by any particular political formation (save the 1919 Radicals), but was instead partially inherited by the broadly defined Left (table 8). By the 1930s, however, the Left's implantation had lost what little locational heritage it had acquired from its Montagnard predecessors.<sup>27</sup>

In the Creuse it is even more difficult to trace communism's geographical origins back to the middle of the nineteenth century: there exists no association whatsoever between cantonal support for the Montagnards and backing for either the Communists, the Socialists, the Radicals, or the Left (except in 1932) in the following century (table 7). Finally, in the Haute-Vienne, there was equally no consistent link between *démoc-soc* voting and communism in the twenties and thirties. However, Montagnard voting was a better predictor of Socialist support in 1910, 1919, and 1924 than it was in the Corrèze - although it should be underlined that the relationship was still a moderate one. Perhaps it was no accident that this occurred in a department where the SFIO was particularly strong (37.4% of the vote in 1910; 55.5% in 1914) and radicalism on the wane, but this is only a hypothesis. More so than in the other Limousin departments, the Haute-Vienne Left preserved, and even strengthened, a moderate geographical link with the *démocrates-socialistes* well into the 1930s, thus illustrating once again that when part of the *démoc-soc* heritage survived into the first decades of the twentieth century it was inherited by the entire Left more so than by any particular political party.

The link between turn of the century radicalism, and socialism and communism in later years, is even more elusive than it was with the *démoc-soc*. Communes which voted radical in 1898 (Haute-Vienne), 1906 (Corrèze), 1910, and 1914 did not tend to support pre-Tours Socialist candidates or Communist candidates in the twenties and thirties (table 9). Indeed one can generally argue that the more communes had supported the Radicals, the less they voted for Left parties in future decades.

While communism inherited the SFIO's geographical patterns of support in the Limousin and the Dordogne, it is far more difficult to trace this lineage back to the Radicals and the *Démoc-Socs*. Those links which did exist between Montagnard voting and future Socialist or Communist support - as in the Haute-Vienne - were, if anything, tentative and irregular. In the Corrèze (and the evidence indicates that this was to varying degrees the case in the other departments), communes neither gradually nor consistently moved from radicalism to socialism or communism. Socialism in this area was *not* a radicalized form of radicalism (which is what the *toujours plus à gauche* interpretation implies) but a *new* political phenomenon which, in its early years, found a small though dedicated electorate in communes where it - and later the Communist party - would continue to do well over the years.<sup>28</sup> Socialism did not continue an electoral tradition in this region, but one can surely argue that it created a new one which the Communists later appropriated.

## II

The preceding correlational analysis broadly describes the voting behavior of communes and counties, not of individual voters. The strong geographical continuity between socialism and communism, for example, should not be interpreted as indicating that former Socialist voters supported the Communists; what is true of communes is not necessarily so of individuals. Having placed the Communist vote within a longer term perspective, we need to turn our sights to the short term in order to establish who Communist voters were, and who they had supported in the past. Plotting the trajectory of voters in the pre and post-war years is key to understanding the birth and development of communism in this region. Were the majority of the first Communists voters former Socialists? And how faithful would Communists electors remain to their Party over the years to come? Ecological regression is the most reliable statistical technique to infer individual level behavior from aggregate electoral results.<sup>29</sup> Ecological regression has rarely - if ever - been used in the analysis of past French elections, and this despite the French fascination (not always shared by scholars of France on this side of the Atlantic) with political geography and electoral history.

I have used ecological regression to compute voter transition tables between pairs of successive elections in the Corrèze between 1906 and 1936.<sup>30</sup> The analysis has been pushed back to 1906 - 14 years before the Communist party's foundation - in order to trace the origins of Socialist and Communist voting in this department. The transition tables provide us with *estimates* of voter behavior in the short term, while the correlational analysis sheds light on longer term geographical permanence. The data I have used is based on the registered electorate

in each of the Corrèze's 289 communes, a figure which, to take two examples, accounts for over 95.5% of all eligible men over the age of twenty-one in both 1932 and 1936.<sup>31</sup> I have included non-voters and ineligible voters (those eligible to vote in one election but not the other) in the regression equations; this last category is of particular importance in the Corrèze. Poverty and difficult living conditions had driven large numbers of the Corrèze's inhabitants to migrate on a temporary and a permanent basis ever since the nineteenth-century and this trend continued, albeit at a slower pace, well into the twentieth-century. As a result the number of registered voters often declined substantially between successive elections: the Corrèze, for instance, lost 10% of its registered voters between 1919 and 1924. In order to estimate the behavior of voters who participated in the first election but were no longer registered to vote in the second, I have in most cases inverted the way transition tables are usually calculated (I have used the first - and not the second - election as the common denominator). In other words, instead of asking how those who voted in 1919 cast their ballots in 1924, I have asked how those who voted in 1924 voted in the previous election.<sup>32</sup>

Socialism in the Corrèze developed at a rapid pace in the years immediately preceding and following the Great War. In 1906, Socialist candidates, on the ballot in only two of the department's five electoral districts, polled a mere .4% of the votes cast, and between 1905 and 1911 the Socialist party actually lost members. ~~By the eve of the war, however, Socialist candidates, present in three of the Corrèze's electoral districts, received close to eight percent of the vote.~~ Socialism's original pre-war supporters were a small, disparate lot of former non-voters, Radicals, and more surprisingly, conservatives (the transition tables adds up to the total registered electorate in the bottom right hand corner. Table 11, for example, shows that 2.5% of the registered electorate voted Socialist in 1914 and had voted for the Right in 1910; examining the columns tells us how those who had voted for the Right in 1910 voted in 1914, and reading the table horizontally illustrates how Right voters in 1914 had cast their ballots in the previous election). Indeed over 40% of those who supported the SFIO in 1914 had backed the Right four years earlier, and in the Tulle-Sud electoral district this proportion reached 60%. Part of this shift was undoubtedly linked to the practice of *la politique du pire* on the local level (voting first and foremost to defeat the Radicals), but it also reflected the radicalization of a fringe of the conservative electorate, which, however, refused to support the continued domination of local political life by the Radical-Socialist party. To draw a profile of Socialist supporters in 1914, they were unlikely to have voted Socialist in previous elections (in part because Socialists had been few and far between), and were in their majority, *not* former Radical voters. Indeed most voters who abandoned the Radical party in that year cast their ballots for the Right (table 11). The pre-war Socialist electorate thus did not owe its existence,

as has often been presumed, to a leftist tradition characterized by voters deserting the Radicals in order to support the Party furthest on the Left.

The war profoundly altered the local political landscape and marked the end of an era for Corrèze radicalism. Having dominated the department's political life in the early years of the century, the Radicals now found themselves trailing the Right and challenged by the Socialists. Even before the elections, Henri Queuille, the young and ambitious leader of the Corrèze's Radical Socialists, realized that his Party's continued success necessitated new faces and policies; he thus eliminated the three outgoing Radical deputies from the Radical list and replaced them with younger, left-leaning candidates.<sup>33</sup> While this strategy paid its dividends in the long term, it probably accentuated the Radicals' defeat in 1919.

The strength of the Radicals was in large part derived from their influence on the local level. The broad network of Radical-leaning municipal councillors, mayors, *conseillers généraux*, did their best to "guide" electors in their local and national political choices, and ensured that favors and services were, if necessary, rendered to them in return for their support. This practice was known as *le bras long* or more commonly in *patois* as *le plaçou* (from the verb *placer*) because deputies intervened on behalf of their constituents on any number of issues, the most important being to find them jobs within the state administration (the post office, for example) or even in private industry.<sup>34</sup> The war disrupted these relationships of patronage which often existed between Radical deputies and their electorate. Soldiers returned home with a profoundly transformed *mentalité* prompting a Sub-Prefect to write that "large numbers of them are liable to ignore the advice of their natural advisers, mayors, parents, groups leaders, and influential electors."<sup>35</sup> And this worked to the detriment of the Radicals more so than any other political grouping.

The major downturn in radicalism's influence in the 1919 legislative elections benefited conservatives more than it did Socialists, and this was not particularly surprising given that the Right, on the national level, emerged as the undisputed victor of these elections. Of those voters who deserted the Radicals in 1919, more cast their ballots for the Right as for the SFIO (table 12). Nor was this a new trend: an examination of the voting transitions between the 1906 and 1910 elections clearly shows that Radical and conservative voters switched back and forth in important proportions (table 10). Still, former Radicals constituted over 40% of the 1919 Socialist electorate, and they were joined by most former Socialist voters as well as an important contingent of those who had chosen not to cast ballots in 1914 (table 12). The new Socialist voters were thus of a different origin than in the pre-war years. Radicalized by the war, dissatisfied with the old political class, attracted by the local Socialist party's anti-militaristic discourse, sectors of the former Radical electorate, as well as some of those who had abstained

in the past, turned towards socialism. Because the Socialists were active on the terrain, held public meetings, organized Party sections, and proposed a coherent and attractive policy to the peasantry, they managed to fill *part* of the void left by the discredit of radicalism. The SFIO's modern political organization (meetings, members, propaganda campaigns, a newspaper), which contrasted favorably to the Radicals' often ephemeral presence between elections and to their lack of political structures at the grassroots,<sup>36</sup> clearly contributed to Socialist successes. The presence of organized militants in the countryside enabled the Socialists to respond to the electorate in ways in which the Radicals could not.

The Socialists were not the sole beneficiaries of Radicalism's decline, and in this sense it is erroneous to think of their growing strength as being the consequence of a traditional *toujours plus à gauche* vote. That large numbers of Radicals jumped ship for conservative - not leftist - shores makes the leftist tradition theory all the more difficult to uphold. Those who came to socialism from radicalism did so for specific social and political reasons which grew out of the war; theirs was not a vote of tradition but a mandate for local and national political change.

Having examined where Socialist voters came from, the key question, of course, is how they cast their ballots following the December 1920 Socialist split which gave birth to the Communist party. Who were the first Communist voters, and who had they supported in the past? Over 66% of the young Communist party's supporters in 1924 had backed the Socialists in 1919; in addition, the Party also captured notable support from former abstainers, and some backing from Radical voters (table 13). But the new Communist party received far from unanimous support from former Socialist voters: close to half of the 1919 Socialists either cast their ballots for the joint Radical-Socialist and Socialist *Cartel des Gauches* list (which included only one Socialist out of four candidates), decided not to vote, or disappeared from the registered electorate altogether (table 13). That some former Socialist voters backed the *Cartel des Gauches* list was not surprising; if anything, what was surprising was that they did so in so few numbers. Others, dissatisfied with the alternative they faced between tepid reformism and Bolshevism, decided not to vote altogether.

Former Socialist voters thus formed the backbone of the new Communist electorate. Once the division between Socialists and Communists was cemented, however, there would be little voter switching between both parties. In 1928, when the Socialists ran for legislative office on their own for the first time since the December 1920 Tours Congress, the overwhelming majority of their support came from those who had supported the *Cartel des Gauches* list in 1924 (table 14). Throughout the interwar years voters seldom moved from socialism to communism, or vice versa. The Socialists would find new voters among former

conservatives in the early thirties and among previous Radicals at the time of the Popular Front (tables 15 and 16), but rarely among previous Communist electors.

The Communist electorate during the interwar period was characterized by a strong degree of stability. The majority of Communist voters in 1928, 1932, and 1936, had supported the Party in the preceding elections. Both in 1928 and at the time of the Popular Front Communist gains came at the expense of the Radicals, and in 1928 these gains were confined to the department's villages, thus underlining the diverging behavior of rural and urban voters.<sup>37</sup> In the late twenties, rural Radical voters were more likely to switch their allegiances to the extreme left than were their urban counterparts. The Communists also experienced some success (in 1928 and 1936) convincing previous abstainers that their participation was indeed worthwhile (tables 14 through 16).<sup>38</sup> The Party's suicidal class against class tactic discouraged its voters who deserted the Party in large numbers in the 1932 legislative elections; some responded by casting their ballots in favor of the Radicals, while others boycotted the polls altogether.

In general the Communists proved unsuccessful at luring away electors from other parties *en masse*. They met with difficulty in their attempts to convert substantial numbers of Radical voters and even greater difficulty courting Socialists. That voter switching was both more common and more extensive between Communists and Radicals, than between Communists and Socialists, poignantly illustrates the permanence and depth of the split between parties which shared a common origin. And that the Communists, despite their incessant efforts, met with less success than Socialists in expanding their electorate, is indicative of the limits of the Party's appeal in the rural Corrèze.

### III

Understanding why the Communists faced difficulties in expanding their base of support necessitates an analysis of who Communist voters were. The Party's problems may, after all, have been linked to the structure of its electorate, and to its inability to make inroads among certain social groups. At a broader level, an explanation of the Party's implantation in the countryside is inseparable from an analysis of the composition of its electorate. Did peasants, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, or agricultural workers constitute the Party's most faithful supporters? Did rural workers support the "Party of the working class" in disproportionate numbers? Did temporary migrants, politicized during their urban sojourns, constitute a key element of the Communist electorate? In short, was the Party's strong showing in the rural Corrèze linked to its backing from any particular occupational group?

To answer this question I have collected complete data from voter registration lists on the occupational composition of all the 72,796 registered voters in 287 of the Corrèze's communes in 1930.<sup>39</sup> Electoral lists, however, do not provide us with an entirely accurate picture of the occupational breakdown of those who worked the land. When men registered to vote they listed their age (at least 21), place of birth, address and occupation, and in the process some did not hesitate to use the opportunity to climb the social ladder *on paper*. In some villages, for instance, small-holding peasants declared themselves as being *propriétaires* instead of less prestigious *cultivateurs*.<sup>40</sup> More troubling is the fact that sharecroppers, agricultural workers, and tenant-farmers tended understandably to list themselves as *cultivateurs* and are thus strongly underrepresented in the electoral lists. In place of this data, I have substituted more trustworthy figures on sharecroppers and agricultural workers culled from a 1930 Prefectoral survey, and statistics on tenant farmers from the village level results of the 1929 *enquête agricole*.<sup>41</sup> The figures concerning all other professions furnish a reliable picture of the occupational structure of the Corrèze's voters.<sup>42</sup> For the purpose of the regression analysis, I have grouped individuals into eight categories: small holding peasants, agricultural workers, tenant-farmers, sharecroppers (the last three categories together form the landless), migrants, artisans and shopkeepers, salaried employees (*ouvriers* and *employés*), and finally, all other professions.<sup>43</sup>

The Corrèze's registered electorate in 1930 was overwhelmingly agricultural (figure 1). Peasants alone constituted 63.8% of all voters, and along with sharecroppers, agricultural workers, and tenant-farmers (the landless), they accounted for 78% of the registered voters. Others worked the land as well. It was not uncommon for artisans and even shopkeepers to cultivate a plot of land on the side. And those who, driven by poverty, migrated to the cities on a temporary basis to work as masons, stonecutters and taxi-drivers, returned to their native villages to tend their land for three to six months a year. Portions of the rural electorate worked more than one trade at the same time, and the great majority were closely tied to the agricultural economy. When the peasantry's income declined, the shopkeepers, artisans, small businessmen, and country doctors who served them, suffered accordingly.

In 1928, the Communists found support among a relatively well spread-out cross section of the rural population: peasants, the landless, artisans and shopkeepers, migrants, and a few salaried employees. Their electorate was more socially balanced than that of any other party. Those who worked the land accounted for two thirds of the Party's electorate, and property owning peasants alone made up one third of the Communist party's voters. An estimated 9% of the total peasant electorate cast its ballot for the Party's candidates (table 17). This was a reasonable performance - the Communists, after all, gathered far more peasant votes than their



Socialist arch-rivals, and the great majority of the Corrèze peasantry never ventured to the left of the Radical-Socialist party. But these results also illustrate the limits of communism's inroads among the peasantry, and this, despite the Party's tireless propaganda campaigns which were largely geared towards the smallholding peasantry. The Communist party's peasant votes were hard won. To gain additional peasant support the Communists invested far more militant effort than did other parties. The fear - skillfully exploited by the Party's opponents - that the Communists, once in power, would split up the land (this was known as *le partageux*), clearly worked to Communist party's detriment.<sup>44</sup>

The landless also formed a key component of the Communist electorate. The Party gathered close to half the landless vote, and together with the Socialists they virtually monopolized it. The more detailed breakdown of the landless vote in table 18 is suggestive, though one should exercise care in interpreting estimates of the political behavior of small percentages of the population. The Communist party, which promised *la terre à celui qui la travaille* (the land to the one who works it), found its strongest support among tenant-farmers, failed to gain the support of sharecroppers, and split the votes of agricultural workers with the other two parties on the Left. Of these three groups, tenants farmers were the closest to small holding peasants,<sup>45</sup> both in terms of interests and economic activity, and they were clearly seduced by the Party's promises to make everyone a *propriétaire*, and its demands for higher prices for agricultural products. Agricultural workers, usually employed in small numbers by better off peasants, (the Corrèze was devoid of large, labor intensive farms) were less likely to recognize themselves in propaganda largely directed at the small peasantry, and the same was true of sharecroppers whose numbers had been consistently declining in the Corrèze.<sup>46</sup> Even in a poor area such as this one the interests of peasants, sharecroppers, and agricultural workers could clash, and the Communists feared that by paying too close attention to those who had no land, they risked alienating those who they considered as being both their main constituents, as well as their largest reservoir of potential voters: the peasants.

The Communists captured half of the migrant vote. Those who migrated on a temporary basis to Paris, Lyon, or St-Etienne to work in the building trades, in the state administration, as taxi drivers, or those who migrated to other rural areas to supplement their income as pit sawyers, traveling cobblers, tinsmiths, and wine merchants, returned to their home villages and supported the Communist party in strong proportions. Historians of the Limousin - and the evidence bears them out in this case - argue that large numbers of migrants turned towards revolutionary politics during their repeated sojourns in urban areas.<sup>47</sup> In the 1920s and 1930s, local police authorities and Communist leaders alike thought that migrants played an important role in the political education of the rural world,<sup>48</sup> and the old Communist militants I

interviewed over fifty years later invariably pointed to migration as *the* explanation of Communist strength in this region.<sup>49</sup> Historians have generally accepted this interpretation. They claim that similar maps of temporary migration and Communist voting illustrate that migrants played a crucial role in disseminating revolutionary ideologies in the countryside and that temporary migrants were largely responsible for socialism's and communism's growth in some of the poorest, most isolated parts of the Corrèze.<sup>50</sup> A detailed regression analysis, however, fails to support this theory. Neither peasants, nor the landless, nor artisans and shopkeepers living in migrant villages were more likely to vote for the Communists than those who lived in other villages. Nor were they more likely to support the Party if they lived in communes with a large percentage of migrant voters (table 20). Migrants displayed political proclivities which distinguished them from their fellow villagers, but they do not seem to have played the influential role in spreading leftist ideas that some have ascribed to them. Even in migrant areas rural communism was not "imported" from urban areas, but was a largely indigenous movement which owed its success to grassroots organizing, and to backing from a broad spectrum of occupational groups.

Finally, artisans and shopkeepers, who occupied a central position in village communities, supported the Communists in notable proportions. Their propensity for left-wing politics - they cast over half their ballots for Socialist and Communist candidates - is striking.<sup>51</sup> Artisans assumed key roles within the Communist party - as village cell secretaries in particular - in part because they were better placed to pass along the Party's watchwords. Peasants from outlying hamlets dropped by their shop, located in the village center, to conduct business, catch up on the news, and perhaps have a drink at the café. Rural depopulation, along with the agricultural crisis of the late twenties, hit artisans and shopkeepers particularly hard. As their customers emigrated towards brighter shores, and as those who stayed cut back on their spending, blacksmiths, carpenters, and sabot-makers, along with bakers, grocers, and café owners (to give a few examples) found that they, too, had trouble making ends meet. For most of these people defending their livelihood meant first and foremost defending the interests of their main clients: the peasants.<sup>52</sup> Less concerned about the threat of *le partage* (splitting up the land), they turned towards the Left in an effort to find a solution to the agricultural crisis.

Largely preoccupied with their work among the peasantry, Corrèze Communists, not fully aware of the importance of artisans and shopkeepers within their electorate, rarely made sustained efforts to increase their support among these groups. In the mid-1920s, Léon Bossavy, one of the Party's most gifted local leaders, known for his physical resemblance to Lenin, launched a one-man effort to group artisans and shopkeepers throughout the Corrèze and bring them over to the Party's views.<sup>53</sup> Bossavy's growing interest in these social groups eventually

contributed to his separation from the Party in the late twenties. It was difficult enough, in the face of *ouvriériste* pressures, to pursue work among the peasantry, but to go after the votes of what Bossavy termed the "middle classes" posed even greater problems. Not until late 1937 did Corrèze Communists renew their attempts to increase their audience among artisans and shopkeepers.<sup>54</sup> That Communists nonetheless received notable support from these groups indicates that their peasant propaganda struck a chord with village blacksmiths, cobblers, carpenters, grocers, and so on, whose fortunes were closely linked to those of the peasantry.

The Communists thus found support in the countryside not among sharecroppers, rural workers and employees, but from a balanced mix of small holding peasants, tenant farmers, agricultural workers, temporary migrants, artisans and shopkeepers. Their electors shared close ties to the agricultural economy and were sensitive to its downturns and fluctuations. The Communists, on the other hand, did poorly among those whose economic well-being was less dependent on the peasantry: workers and employees (who in their majority voted for the Radicals), along with members of all other professions such as notables, merchants, businessmen, *rentiers*, students, and the retired, who divided their allegiances between Radicals and Conservatives. The social composition of the Party's electorate emerged largely unscathed from the Party's strong setback at the polls in 1932 (table 19). Those who worked the land still provided two thirds of the Party's votes; the proportion of artisans and shopkeepers in the Communist electorate increased while the Party lost some support among migrants. Over time, stability was the dominant trait of the social composition of the Communist electorate.

These findings contrast with the results of previous investigations. For Philippe Gratton, the Party's support in the Corrèze came primarily from small-holding peasants (and not tenant farmers or artisans) and from the Tulle working class.<sup>55</sup> Gratton's questionable theory that the strength of Corrèze rural communism walked hand in hand with the success of a Communist sponsored agricultural trade union of small holders, blinded him to the possibility that the Party could have received backing from other rural groups.<sup>56</sup> The quantitative study presented above, however, illustrates how varied the Party's electorate was in a department largely composed of peasant voters, brings to light the role of artisans and shopkeepers (ignored by previous observers of rural communism)<sup>57</sup> while suggesting that rural workers were less sympathetic to the Party of the working class than commonly presumed.

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Communists, and their pre-1920 Socialists predecessors, were neither the beneficiaries of a long-standing leftist tradition, nor the clear successors of the Radicals. "Tradition" did not motivate rural voters to cast their ballots for Socialist and later Communist candidates. The

absence of a *toujours plus à gauche* vote in one of the regions where it has been thought strongest places Communist successes in new perspective, and underlines that an explanation of the Party's strength in the countryside is to be found in the economic, social, and political development of the first four decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, the long term electoral analysis presented for the four Limousin and Dordogne departments questions the commonly accepted idea that French political parties have geographical roots that reach far back in time.

Neither local Communists, Prefects, nor contemporary observers of the political scene preoccupied themselves with the structure and composition of the Party's electorate - if anything the assumption was that members and voters alike were largely peasants.<sup>58</sup> It was surely no accident if Prefects referred to the Party as *le parti communiste paysan* and the movement as a whole as *le communisme agraire*.<sup>59</sup> The present analysis, however, suggests that it was not a peasant communism as much as it was a *rural* communism. Far from France's industrial heartland the Party mobilized a diverse, original rural electorate of small holding peasants, tenant farmers, agricultural workers, artisans and shopkeepers. The coalition the Communists forged in the early twenties remained remarkably faithful to a Party which, following initial successes, experienced difficulty in substantially expanding both its electorate and its geographical base until after the Second World War.

The Limousin and Dordogne, long ignored by observers of all kind, and rarely given serious treatment in histories of the French Communist movement, are among those regions which have survived the Party's important losses since the late 1970s. For reasons rooted both in history and in the present day rural sociology of the region, the remnants of the *rural* movement which Corrèze Communists built in the 1920s have at times outlasted - if only temporarily - the Party's better known urban bastions. Here, as elsewhere, it is perhaps only a matter of time before the Party disappears in large part from the political landscape, thus completing an ongoing process which is partially related to the disappearance of the rural social groups which contributed to make this area a stronghold of French communism for over sixty years.

## NOTES

1. See Philippe Robrieux, *Histoire intérieure du Parti communiste, 1920-1945* (Paris, 1980), I: 250 and Danielle Tartakowsky, *Les premiers communistes français* (Paris, 1980), p. 124.

2. François Goguel, *Géographie des élections françaises sous la troisième et la quatrième République* (Paris, 1970), p. 78.

3. Daniel Halévy, *Visites aux paysans du centre (1907-1934)* (Paris, 1978), p. 182. The complete *visites* were published in 1934, but the essay I am referring to first came out in 1922.

4. Ernest Labrousse, "Géographie du socialisme," *La revue socialiste* 2 (June 1946): 137-148; "La montée du socialisme en France depuis un siècle (1845-1945)," *La revue socialiste* 1 (1946): 18-27. Goguel, *Géographie des élections françaises* and *Chroniques électorales. Les scrutins politiques en France de 1945 à nos jours*, 3 vols. (Paris, 1981-83).

5. Goguel, *Chroniques électorales*, I: 85.

6. Examples of this are too numerous to cite, but see Goguel's work cited above and Jacques Fauvet, *Histoire du parti communiste français*, 2 vols., (Paris, 1964), I: 70-1, 187-8, II: 338-9; Annie Kriegel, *Les communistes français*, new ed., (Paris, 1985), p. 105; Jean-Paul Brunet, *Une histoire du PCF* (Paris, 1982), p. 39; Charles A. Micaud, *Communism and the French Left* (New York, 1963), p. 130; Philip M. Williams, *Politics in Post-War France* (London, 1954), p. 54, and his *French Politicians and Elections 1951-1969* (Cambridge, 1970), p. 18; Jean-Marie Mayeur, *La vie politique sous la troisième République* (Paris, 1984), pp. 206, 322. Even Frédéric Bon and Jean-Paul Cheylan in their methodologically sophisticated *La France qui vote* (Paris, 1988) have recourse to tradition to explain communism's strength in the Limousin (p. 88).

7. Fauvet, *Histoire du parti communiste français*, I: 71. François Hincker also sees rural communism as a *vote républicain* and proposes that the reason why the peasantry votes Communist (and not Socialist or Radical) in some areas of *tradition de gauche* is essentially accidental. He writes "...l'électorat communiste, c'est tout à la fois la paysannerie 'rouge' de certains départements qui, par héritage historique dont l'origine est souvent accidentelle, vote ici pour le PC alors qu'ailleurs, pour les mêmes motivations républicaines, elle voterait socialiste, voire radical." "Les hommes contre," *Autrement* 38 (March 1986), p. 16

8. Goguel, *Géographie des élections françaises*, p. 78 and *Chroniques électorales*, I: 80-84. Presumably industrialized regions have political traditions as well, but for Goguel these are not key to explaining communism's implantation.

9. In a number of provocative, though in the end unconvincing books Emmanuel Todd and Hervé Le Bras have argued that communism's strength in the countryside can only be explained by the presence of particular family structures. See their *L'invention de la France* (Paris, 1981), p. 49, 86; Le Bras, *Les trois France* (Paris, 1986), pp. 120-131; and Todd, *La nouvelle France* (Paris, 1988), pp. 104-06

10. See Jacques Girault, "Parti communiste et électorat. L'exemple du Var en 1936," in Girault et al., *Sur l'implantation du Parti communiste français dans l'entre-deux-guerres* (Paris, 1977), pp. 273-300.

11. Michel Cadé, *Le parti des campagnes rouges. Histoire du Parti communiste dans les Pyrénées-Orientales 1920-1939* (Vinça, 1988), pp. 17, 83, 132, 260.

12. Jean-Pierre Vaudon, "L'implantation du Parti communiste dans les milieux ruraux des arrondissements d'Issoire et de Thiers de 1920 à 1936," *Le mouvement social* no. 74 (Janvier-Mars 1974), pp. 89-96.

13. Sally Sokoloff, "Communism and the French Peasantry, with Special Reference to the Allier," Ph. D. Thesis, London University, 1975, p. 264. In a later article Sokoloff repeated her conclusions but also argued that the Party's rural support came from forestry workers who worked a plot of land on the side, and from smallholding wine growers. See "Land Tenure and Political Tendency in Rural France: The Case of Sharecropping," *European Studies Review* 10 (1980), pp. 376-7.

14. Gordon Wright, "Communists and Peasantry in France," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Modern France* (Princeton, 1951), pp. 227, 229.

15. This question is also the title of Georges Lavau's book (Paris, 1981).

16. Michel Hastings, "Halluin-la-Rouge 1919-1939. Aspects d'un communisme identitaire. Singularités écologiques et stratégies d'implantation," Thèse de Doctorat de Science Politique, Université de Lille 2, 1988, pp. 2 ff; Stéphane Courtois, "Construction et déconstruction du communisme français," *Communisme* no.15-16 (1987): 52-74.

17. Among recent examples of a large literature, M. C. Cleary, *Peasants, Politicians, and Producers. The Organisation of Agriculture in France since 1918* (Cambridge, 1989); P. M. Jones, *Politics and Rural Society. The Southern Massif Central c. 1750-1880* (Cambridge, 1985); Annie Moulin, *Les paysans dans la société française* (Paris, 1988); Claude Pennetier, *Le socialisme dans le Cher 1851-1921* (Paris and La Charité-sur-Loire, 1982); Pierre Vallin, *Paysans rouges du Limousin* (Paris, 1985).

18. Best exemplified by the work of André Siegfried, François Goguel, and their students.

19. For an analysis of rural communism in the Corrèze, see Philippe Gratton's "Le communisme rural en Corrèze," in his *Les paysans français contre l'agrarisme* (Paris, 1972), pp. 13-42. While I disagree with Gratton's conclusions, he had the merit of posing an important historical problem.

20. In the following analysis the Radical vote is the total vote for *all* Radical candidates (broadly interpreted) in one given election. Electoral results are from *Archives Nationales* (hereafter AN), C7208, C7228, C7243, C7251, C10002, C10006, C10011, C10016, C10021, C10027, C10031, C10032, C10039, C10045, C10046, and C10055; *Archives départementales de la Corrèze* (hereafter ADC), 3M189-3M200; *Archives départementales de la Creuse*, 3M304; *Archives départementales de la Dordogne*, 3M90; *Le Journal de Bergerac* 17 and 24 May 1924 and *L'Union Sarladaise*, 18 May 1924; and the *Archives départementales de la Haute-Vienne*, 3M162, 3M164. The Socialist candidate in the district of Bellac (Haute-Vienne) in 1910, Château, was disqualified for not having filed his candidacy on time, and his votes were declared void. I have reconstituted Château's support by consulting the *bulletins nuls* in AN C6781.

21. In 1849 votes were counted by *circonscription* of which they were three or more per canton. Communal level results are not available for this election. The 1849 results are based on the maps in Jacques Bouillon, "Les élections législatives du 13 Mai 1849 en Limousin," *Bulletin de la société archéologique et historique du Limousin* 84 (1954): 467-496.

22. It has been necessary to conduct the correlational analysis for each department separately because a detailed regression analysis for the entire Limousin and Dordogne reveals considerable regional differentiation in the base of support of political parties.

23. The meaning of the correlations I have calculated can be explained as follows: a high correlation coefficient indicates that support for the political party concerned is geographically stable, while a low coefficient indicates change in the geographical base of support for that Party. Correlation coefficients measure whether a Party's share of the vote changes (up or down) by widely different levels in *all* communes, but it does *not* measure *across the board change*, which would be the case if the Party's gained or lost 20% of the vote in the majority of communes. In the latter case the ordering of the communes does not change notably and thus the correlation will be of a high level. It follows that a strong positive correlation can be obtained for a Party that received 55% of the vote in one election and only 8% in the next one. In that case, a high correlation would simply suggest that the Party's losses were roughly similar in all of the department's communes. See Jerome Clubb, William Flanigan, and Nancy Zingale, *Partisan Realignment. Voters, Parties and Government in American History* (Beverly Hills, Ca., 1980): pp. 49ff.

24. The Socialist party first obtained a significant result at the departmental level in 1910 when it obtained 3.37% of the vote. SFIO candidates were on the ballot in three of five electoral districts comprising 125 of the department's 289 communes. ADC 3M190.

25. A strong correlation does not imply that there was no geographical reordering whatsoever. But the predominant characteristic here was stability.

26. On the 1849 elections in the Limousin see Bouillon, "Les élections législatives du 13 Mai 1849."

27. Compare these results with Ernest Labrousse's influential article "Géographie du socialisme," where the author traces the better part of the geographical implantation of the modern French left back to the 1849 Montagnards. Labrousse had called attention to the correspondence between the *démoc-soc* and the joint Socialist-Communist map of electoral support in the twentieth century. The correlations do not support this thesis in the three Limousin departments. In nine of twelve elections the correlation between the *démoc-soc* and the combined Socialist-Communist vote is actually lower than it is for the Left as a whole, and never reaches significant levels.

28. I thus disagree with Denis Faugeras who argues that rural communism was the "natural child" of the Radical Party and constituted nothing more than a "Parti Radical bis." "Recherches sur l'évolution politique de la Corrèze sous la troisième République 1871-1946," Thèse de doctorat d'état en Droit, Université de Limoges, 1986, pp. 527-8.

29. The best discussion of ecological regression remains J. Morgan Kousser, "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Past Politics," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 4 (1973): 237-262; see also Laura Irwin Langbein and Allan J. Lichtman, *Ecological Inference* (Beverly Hills and London, 1978), pp. 50-60; Randolph A. Roth, "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of Voter Behavior," *Historical Methods* 19 (1986): 103-117; David E. and Stephane E. Booth, "An Introduction to the Use of Ecological and Robust Regression in Historical Research,"

*Historical Methods* 21 (1988): 35-44. Ecological regression has recently been used by scholars of Weimar Germany eager to identify who National Socialists voters were, and who they had previously backed. Among the best and most recent examples of this work is Jürgen W. Falter and Reinhard Zintl, "The Economic Crisis of the 1930s and the Nazi Vote," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 19 (1988): 55-85.

30. The transition tables were obtained by running least squares regressions where the dependent variable was the percentage vote for Party a in election a, and the independent variables the percentage vote for parties a, b, c, d,... etc., along with non-voters and ineligible in election b.

31. The tables are based on 290 cases because the town of Tulle was divided into two electoral precincts, each belonging to separate cantons.

32. A number of analysts argue that the regressions should be weighted by the number of electors in order to control for important variations in population between villages. I have compared the results of both the unweighted and weighted regressions and have found few notable differences. I have generally opted for the transition table which produced the fewest "illogical results" (outside the 0 to 100% bounds) or which corresponded best to the historical evidence. The percentages in the unweighted transition tables are mean percentages, while those in the weighted tables are the actual percentages.

33. For a few comments on this see Gilles Le Beguec, "Henri Queuille: L'originalité d'un parcours politique," In *Henri Queuille et la Corrèze. Actes du Colloque de Tulle* (Limoges, 1986), 31-2.

34. This was important in a poor region such as the Corrèze. A job within the administration was a guarantee of a secure income for a family.

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35. ADC 3M194, sous-préfet Ussel to préfet Corrèze, 3 September 1919.

36. On the difference between Radical and Socialist models of political organization, Serge Berstein, "Les partis," in René Rémond, ed., *Pour une histoire politique* (Paris, 1988), pp. 70-73.

37. This is made clear by a more detailed regression analysis which shows that in 1928 the Communists received no support from former Radical voters in the Corrèze's 13 largest towns.

38. For Annie Moulin Communist gains in the rural Corrèze in 1936 were the result of Radical voters moving to the left. The transition table, however, indicates that the PCF also gathered notable support from previous non-voters. *Les paysans dans la société française*, p. 191.

39. I have excluded the department's two largest towns, Tulle and Brive, from this analysis.

40. The electoral law required voters to submit documents proving their age and nationality, but required no proof of one's occupation. In general it seems that a voter's declaration of his profession was transcribed to the electoral list, but in some cases it is clear that the administrative committee in charge arbitrarily called all peasants *propriétaires*, or all those who worked the land *cultivateurs*. On voter registration lists see Léo Goldenberg and Roger Pinto, *La révision des listes électorales* (Paris, [1936]), and A. de Taillandier, *Manuel de la révision de la liste électorale*, 4th ed., (Paris, 1923).



41. For data on sharecroppers and agricultural workers see ADC 7M47, and for tenant farmers the results of the *enquête agricole* in ADC 7M306-7M318. The *enquête agricole* was the subject of much confusion throughout the entire country (the final results were not published until 1936) and the initial forms were so poorly filled out that local authorities were asked to complete them a second time. I have ignored the initial results which can be found in ADC 6M577-6M580 and used the results which were adjusted by the *direction des services agricoles*. The sum of these figures does not always correspond to the departmental wide totals printed in the published *enquête* in 1936. The voter registration lists I have used are in ADC 3M93-3M176.

42. Electoral lists have rarely been used by students of French elections. I have preferred them to census lists (*listes nominatives*) because they provide a far more accurate picture of the registered electorate: the *listes nominatives* include men who were either not eligible or not registered to vote. In general, I have not found census lists to be more accurate concerning a person's profession than voter registration rolls. Some have cautioned, correctly, that voter registration lists provide us only with an elector's profession at the time of his initial registration, and that officials were not required to note occupational changes in subsequent years. I have compared electoral lists for 1920, 1930, and 1939 and have found a number of instances concerning voters whose names appear in all three years with two or three different professions listed - thus demonstrating that the occupation of some voters was updated over time. This is not surprising in small villages where those in charge of updating voter registration lists knew their electors well. In Lyon, Jean-Luc Pinol found that in the "great majority of cases" the profession of voters was identical or similar on voter registration lists and on the *listes nominatives*. See his *Espace social et espace politique. Lyon à l'époque du Front populaire* (Lyon, 1980), p. 168 note 58, and pp. 8, 9, 46 for a discussion of voter registration lists. See as well Jacques Girault et al., "Remarques sur l'étude de l'électorat communiste," *Cahiers d'histoire de l'Institut Maurice Thorez* (Jan 1973), p. 37, note 10. Few have attempted to estimate the social composition of a given party's electorate based on voter registration lists; those who have done so have rarely submitted convincing statistical evidence in support of their findings. Consult Pierre George's study on Bourg-la-Reine in Charles Morazé et al., *Etudes de sociologie électorale* (Paris, 1947), François Goguel, *Initiation aux recherches de géographie électorale* (Paris, 1949), pp. 80-87, and on the Communist party, Girault's articles cited above and his, "Vie politique et catégories sociales populaires: l'exemple du Var dans les années 1930," in *Classes et catégories sociales. Aspects de la recherche* (Roubaix, 1985), pp. 193-198. Girault's work demonstrates the difficulty of drawing broad conclusions concerning the Communist electorate without a minimal use of quantification.

43. I originally worked with a more detailed list of twenty one occupational categories, but the small size of many of these groups (e.g., merchants, schoolteachers, *rentiers* and the retired) makes it difficult to provide reliable estimates of their political behavior. I have controlled the regression equations for religiosity (percentage of civil burials 1924-1938; my thanks to Louis Pérouas for kindly providing me with this data), population change between 1931 and 1901, and population density per km<sup>2</sup> in 1931. I have preferred the unweighted coefficients to those weighted by the registered electorate in 1930 largely because the latter produce more "illogical" estimates (i.e., outside the 0-100% limits) than the former. There are no major differences between the two - save for artisans which I discuss below.

44. On the Party's efforts among the peasantry see Laird Boswell, "Rural Communism in France, 1920-1939: The Example of the Limousin and the Dordogne," Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1988, pp. 471-499.

45. It is telling that virtually all tenant farmers listed themselves as *cultivateurs* on the electoral lists. This was far less the case of sharecroppers and agricultural workers.

46. The regression overestimates the strength of the Right among sharecroppers; calculated using only those 211 communes where Conservatives candidates were present, the regression indicates a more moderate relationship between sharecropping and the Right.

47. Gratton, "Le communisme rural en Corrèze," pp. 19-22.

48. *Le Travailleur de la Terre*, August-September 1924; *Le Travailleur du Centre-Ouest*, 4 and 11 September 1926, 25 February 1933.

49. Interview with Marcel Theyzillat at his home in Lacelle (Corrèze), 2 September 1983.

50. Gratton, "Le communisme rural en Corrèze," pp. 21-22.

51. The weighted regression suggest notably stronger conservative support among artisans and shopkeepers. This is because artisans and shopkeepers in ten of the department's largest towns (excluding Brive and Tulle) voted in strong proportions for the Right, thus underlining that artisans behaved differently in urban and rural settings.

52. This was all the more true in small villages where it was not uncommon for shopkeepers and artisans to farm a small plot of land on the side.

53. Bossavy was a self-employed *artisan-miroitier* in Tulle. He argued that artisans, shopkeepers, and peasants all belonged to the "middle classes" and could be won over to the cause of the proletariat. *Le Travailleur du Centre Ouest*, 24 December 1927; see also the issues of 12 June 1926 and 19 November 1927.

54. *Le Travailleur de la Corrèze*, 13 November and 4 December 1937.

55. Gratton, "Le communisme rural en Corrèze," p. 33, 41. Gratton forwards no evidence to show that the Party's support in Tulle came from workers. In 1928, the Communists received 23.4% of the vote in Tulle (versus 21.1% in the Corrèze as a whole) and some of that support clearly came from peasants who lived within the town's limits, and from shopkeepers and artisans. The Party met with consistent difficulty in trying to organize the town's workers. See ADC 4M282 and *Archives Nationales* F<sup>7</sup> 13120.

56. Jean-Marie Denquin has proposed that the Communist party's Corrèze electorate in the 1950s and 1960s was largely composed of farmers (*agriculteurs*), though once again the evidence to support this contention is lacking. See *Le renversement de la majorité électorale dans le département de la Corrèze 1958-1973* (Paris, 1973), p. 27.

57. While Michel Cadé finds that in the Pyrénées-Orientales shopkeepers and artisans accounted for 14.4% of the Party's members in 1937-1938, he never suggests that they may have played a role within the Party's electorate, *Le parti des campagnes rouges*, p. 278.

58. The Communists attributed their 1928 success in the northern Corrèze to the votes of small property owners and agricultural workers. *Le Travailleur du Centre Ouest*, 28 April 1928.

59. ADC 7M22, 4M282, and 1M69.

## CORREZE

### Social Composition of Registered Electorate in 1930




Table 1

**Corrèze. Correlation Matrix. Percentage pre-1920 Socialist and Communist vote by commune 1906-1936. (% of registered voters)**

N=	PS 1906 (71)	PS1910 (125)	PS 1914 (191)	PS 1919 (290)	PC 1924 (290)	PC 1928 (290)	PC 1932 (290)
PS 1910	.623						
PS 1914	.518	.545					
PS 1919	.452	.462	.591				
PC 1924	.523	.420	.530	.698			
PC 1928	.531	.327	.615	.717	.774		
PC 1932	.466	.231	.349	.649	.760	.802	
PC 1936	.508	.347	.331	.633	.721	.748	.846

PC = *Parti Communiste*

PS = *Parti Socialiste*

RS = All Radical Candidates

Table 2

**Corrèze. Correlation Matrix. Percentage Socialist Vote by Commune, 1906-1936. (% of registered voters) (Number of Cases in parentheses)**

N=	PS 1906 (71)	PS1910 (125)	PS 1914 (191)	PS 1919 (290)	RS 1924* (290)	PS1928 (153)	PC 1932 (290)
PS 1910	.623						
PS 1914	.518	.545					
PS 1919	.452	.462	.591				
RS 1924*	-.395	-.236	-.303	-.242			
PS 1928		.018 (54)	-.058 (54)	.483 (153)	.188 (153)		
PS 1932	.012	.030	-.210	.148	.152	.723	
PS 1936	-.235	-.051	-.130	.086	.320	.635	.611

\*Radical led *Cartel des Gauches* list which included one socialist candidate

Table 3

**Corrèze. Correlation Matrix. Percentage Radical vote by Commune, 1906-1936.**  
 (N=290 except for RS 1936 where N=236) (% of registered voters)

	RS 1906	RS 1910	RS 1914	RS 1919	RS 1924*	RS 1928	RS 1932
RS 1910	.398						
RS 1914	.205	.623					
RS 1919	-.179	.025	.344				
RS 1924*	.075	.140	.345	.472			
RS 1928	-.327	-.268	.138	.579	.278		
RS 1932	.017	-.271	-.030	.353	.312	.634	
RS 1936	-.103	-.026	.102	.168	-.077	.209	.375

\* Radical led *Cartel des gauches* list which included one Socialist candidate.

Table 4

**Haute-Vienne. Correlation Matrix. Percentage pre-1920 Socialist and Communist Vote by Commune, 1898-1936. (% of registered voters)**

N=	PS 1898 (63)	PS1910 (205)	PS 1914 (205)	PS 1919 (206)	PC 1924 (206)	PC 1928 (206)	PC 1932 (206)
PS 1910	.327						
PS 1914	.205	.781					
PS 1919	.378	.627	.740				
PC 1924	.501	.328	.237	.361			
PC 1928	.504	.595	.497	.601	.728		
PC 1932	.568	.543	.430	.477	.735	.836	
PC 1936	.449	.448	.395	.461	.716	.819	.876

Table 5

**Dordogne. Correlation Matrix. Percentage Pre-1920 Socialist, and Communist vote by Canton, 1910-1936, (% of registered voters) (N=47)**

	PS 1910	PS 1914	PS 1919	PC 1924	PC 1928	PC
1932						
PS 1914	.584					
PS 1919	.467	.815				
PC 1924	.385	.756	.827			
PC 1928	.414	.647	.651	.769		
PC 1932	.263	.679	.753	.862	.793	
PC 1936	.274	.609	.507	.595	.686	.693

Table 6

**Creuse. Correlation Matrix. Percentage 1919 Socialist and Communist Vote by Commune, 1919-1936. (N = 266)**

	PS 1919	PC 1924	PC 1928	PC 1932
PC 1924	0.405			
PC 1928	0.620	0.480		
PC 1932	0.624	0.504	0.776	
PC 1936	0.489	0.278	0.581	0.662

Table 7

Limousin. Correlation Matrix. Percentage Démocrate-Socialiste Vote in 1849, Socialist, Communist, and Radical Vote by Canton (% of valid votes cast)

## Démocrate-Socialiste vote 1849

	<u>Corrèze</u> (N=29)	<u>Creuse</u> (N=25)	<u>Haute-Vienne</u> (N=29)
PS 1906	-.065		
PS 1910	.202	.036	.324
PS 1914	.091	.053	.200
PS 1919	.143	.055	.362
PC 1924	.293	.047	-.067
PC 1928	.146	.155	.344
PC 1932	.198	.078	.178
PC 1936	.223	.077	.190
PS 1924		.077	.434
PS 1928	.037	-.003	-.207
PS 1932	-.012	.204	.018
PS 1936	-.023	.181	.230
RS 1906	.042		
RS 1910	.242	-.015	-.230
RS 1914	.259	-.292	.153
RS 1919	.363	-.167	.
RS 1924*	.046	.082	
RS 1928	.143	-.044	.229
RS 1932	.030	-.012	.260
RS 1936	-.175	-.282	.326

\* Radical led *Cartel des Gauches* list in the Corrèze which included one Socialist candidate.

Note: In the few instances where a Party was not present in a given district its vote has been set at zero. This has little effect on the coefficients.

Table 8

**Limousin. Correlation Matrix. Percentage Démocrate-Socialiste vote in 1849 and Left vote by Canton, 1906-1936 (% of valid votes cast)**

Démocrate Socialiste vote, 1849

	<u>Corrèze</u> (N=29)	<u>Creuse</u> (N=25)	<u>Haute-Vienne</u> (N=29)
Left 1906	.035		
Left 1910	.294	.073	.000
Left 1914	.338	-.215	.532
Left 1919	.360	-.123	.362
Left 1924	.420	.191	.378
Left 1928	.311	.104	.360
Left 1932	.221	.377	.414
Left 1936	.000	-.138	.515

Table 9

**Corrèze and Haute-Vienne. Correlation Matrix of Radical vote with Socialist and Communist Voting, 1898-1936. (% of registered votes)  
(Number of cases in parentheses)**

N=	<u>Corrèze</u>			<u>Haute-Vienne</u>		
	RS 06 (290)	RS 10 (290)	RS 14 (290)	RS 98 (203)	RS 10 (186)	RS 14 (205)
PS 1910	.064 (125)			.327		
PS 1914	.029 (191)	-.431 (191)		.256	-.416	
PS 1919	.049	-.072	-.076	.311	-.297	-.331
PC 1924	.053	-.031	-.085	.002	-.255	-.097
PC 1928	.020	-.155	-.169	.179	-.296	-.047
PC 1932	-.088	-.086	-.057	.170	-.356	-.078
PC 1936	-.054	-.056	.029	.214	-.363	.002



Table 10

**Corrèze. Estimated voter movements between 1906 and 1910 legislative elections.**  
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1906 registered electorate)

<u>1910 Election</u>	<u>1906 Election</u>				% of 1906 Electorate
	PS	RAD	RIGHT	NV	
PS	.1	.7	.2	.6	1.6
RAD	0	33.9	12.3	1.8	48
RIGHT	0	10.7	7.4	2.2	20
NV	.2	4.6	5.3	19.3	29.5
INEL	0	.1	.2	.4	.7
% of 1906 Electorate	.3	50	25.4	24.2	100

PC = *Parti Communiste*

PS = *Parti Socialiste*

RAD = All Radical Candidates

RIGHT = All Right Candidates

NV = non voters

INEL = Ineligible (eligible to vote in election a but not in election b, or vice-versa)

**Note:** Percentages calculated through ecological regression. Estimates which fall outside the 0-100% logical bounds have been set to their respective minimum or maximum, and remaining cell entries have been adjusted by an iterative fitting procedure.

Table 11

**Corrèze. Estimated voter movements between 1910 and 1914 legislative elections.**  
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1910 registered electorate)

<u>1914 Election</u>	<u>1910 Election</u>				% of 1910 Electorate
	PS	RAD	RIGHT	NV	
PS	.6	1.2	2.5	1	5.3
RAD	.4	40.8	0	.8	42
RIGHT	0	6.3	15.5	0	21.8
NV	.4	0	2.3	20	22.8
INEL	.2	.2	.3	7.4	8.1
% of 1910 Electorate	1.6	48.2	20.6	29.5	100

Table 12

**Corrèze. Estimated voter movements between 1914 and 1919 legislative elections.**  
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1919 registered electorate; weighted by registered electorate in 1919)

<u>1914 Election</u>	<u>1919 Election</u>				% of 1919 Electorate
	PS	RAD	RIGHT	NV	
PS	4	1.8	0	.1	5.8
RAD	7.3	22.3	9.6	5.7	44.9
RIGHT	.5	.4	18.4	3.6	22.8
NV	4.9	1.8	0	18.6	25.4
INEL	.3	0	0	.6	1
% of 1919 Electorate	17	26.3	27.9	28.7	100

Table 13

**Corrèze. Estimated voter movements between 1919 and 1924 legislative elections.**  
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1919 registered electorate; weighted by registered electorate in 1919)

<u>1924 Election</u>	<u>1919 Election</u>				% of 1919 Electorate
	PS	RAD	RIGHT	NV	
PC	9.6	1.2	0	4.6	15.4
RAD	3.7	21	9.3	3.4	37.4
RIGHT	0	0	18.6	2.6	21.2
NV	2.6	2.3	0	11.6	16.6
INEL	1.1	1.8	0	6.4	9.4
% of 1919 Electorate	17	26.3	27.9	28.7	100

Table 14

**Corrèze. Estimated voter movements between 1924 and 1928 legislative elections.**  
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1924 registered electorate)

<u>1928 Election</u>	<u>1924 Election</u>					% of 1924 Electorate
	PC	RAD	RIGHT	NV		
PC	11.7	2.3	.4	1.7		16.1
PS	.9	6.4	.6	0		8
RAD	1.4	24.2	8	1.8		35.4
RIGHT	.2	6.5	13.9	.2		20.8
NV	0	3.7	.9	14.8		19.4
INEL	0	.1	0	.2		.3
% of 1924 Electorate	14.2	43.2	23.8	18.7		100

Table 15

**Corrèze. Estimated voter movements between 1928 and 1932 legislative elections.**  
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1928 registered electorate; weighted by the registered electorate in 1928)

<u>1932 Election</u>	<u>1928 Election</u>					% of 1928 Electorate
	PC	PS	RAD	RIGHT	NV	
PC	10.4	.9	.3	0	.5	12.2
PS	1	7.6	.5	5	1.3	15.5
RAD	3.4	0	24.8	5.4	3.2	36.8
RIGHT	.7	.7	0	12.6	1.6	15.6
NV	1.5	0	6	0	12.3	19.8
INEL	0	0	0	0	0	.1
% of 1928 Electorate	17.1	9.2	31.7	23	19	100

Table 16

**Corrèze. Estimated voter movements between 1932 and 1936 legislative elections.**  
(Row column percentages; village level data) (N=290) (by percent of 1932 registered electorate; weighted by the registered electorate in 1936)

<u>1932 Election</u>	<u>1936 Election</u>						% of 1936 Electorate
	PC	PS	RAD	RIGHT	PS	NV	
PC	10.7	1.1	0	.1	.1	.1	12.1
PS	1	11.4	0	2.7	.3	.3	15.4
RAD	3.5	14.1	13.2	2.6	3.2	3.2	36.6
RIGHT	0	1.4	2.1	9.9	2.1	2.1	15.5
NV	2.5	0	5.7	0	11.4	11.4	19.7
INEL	0	.2	.2	0	.2	.2	.6
% of 1936 Electorate	17.9	28.3	21.1	15.3	17.3	17.3	100

Table 17

**Corrèze. Estimated voting behavior of Social groups in 1928 (% of 1930 Registered Electorate) (N=282)**

	PC	PS	RAD	RIGHT	PS	NV	% of 1930 Electorate
Peasants	5.3	.9	29.3	16.8	11.4	11.4	63.8
Landless	6.2	5	0	.2	3	3	14.4
Migrants	1.1	0	.7	0	.6	.6	2.4
Artshop	2.8	2.1	0	1.7	2.2	2.2	8.8
Salaried	.8	0	2.7	0	.5	.5	4
Other	0	0	3.6	2.7	.5	.5	6.7
% of 1930 Electorate	16.2	8	36.3	21.4	18.1	18.1	100

**Note:** Percentages calculated through ecological regression. Estimates which fall outside the 0-100% logical bounds have been set to their respective minimum or maximum, and remaining cell entries have been adjusted by an iterative fitting procedure. Controlling for lack of religious practice (percentage of civil burials, 1924-1938), population change between 1931 and 1901, and population per km<sup>2</sup> in 1931.

Peasants = *Cultivateurs* and *propriétaires*

Landless = Sharecroppers, tenant farmers, agricultural workers.

Migrants = Those in migrant communes working in the building industry (*maçons, cimentiers, plâtriers, peintres, couvreurs, etc.*), taxi drivers, *chauffeurs, livreurs, garçon de café, scieurs de long*, cobblers, traveling salesmen, umbrella salesmen, tinsmiths.

Artshop = Artisans and shopkeepers.

Other = merchants, *entrepreneurs*, schoolteachers, doctors, soldiers, students, *rentiers*, the unemployed, and all other professions.

Table 18

**Corrèze. Estimated voting behavior of Social groups in 1928 (% of Registered Voters)  
(N=280)**

	PC28	PS28	RAD28	RIGHT28	NV28	% of 1930 Electorate
Peasants	6.8	1.3	27.8	15.3	12.5	63.7
Sharecroppers	0	.9	0	1.9	.6	3.5
Agri Workers	1.6	1.6	2.1	.2	.7	6.3
Tenant Farmers	2.7	1.6	0	0	.4	4.7
Migrants	1.2	0	.5	0	.6	2.4
Artshop	3	2.7	0	1.1	2	8.8
Salaried	1	0	2.4	0	.5	4
Other	0	0	3.3	2.7	.6	6.7
% of 1930 Electorate	16.3	8	36.3	21.2	18	100

Table 19

**Corrèze. Estimated voting behavior of Social groups in 1932 (% of 1930 Registered  
Electorate) (N=282)**

	PC32	PS32	RAD32	RIGHT32	NV32	% of 1930 Electorate
Peasants	3.6	5.4	31.8	9.9	13.1	63.8
Landless	4.4	5.6	1.7	1	1.8	14.4
Migrants	.5	0	.9	0	1	2.4
Artshop	2.6	2	1.1	1.1	1.9	8.8
Salaried	.7	.1	2.1	0	1	4
Other	0	.3	2.7	2.2	1.4	6.7
% of 1930 Electorate	11.7	13.5	40.4	14.2	20.2	100

Table 20

**Voting behavior of Peasants, Landless, and Artisans in Migrant Communes (N=283)**  
(t statistic in parentheses)

	<u>Migrant Communes</u>		<u>High Migrant Communes</u>	
Peasants	-.045	(-.831)	-.005	(1.482)
Landless	.045	(.450)	.007	(.622)
Artisans	-.128	(-.531)	.032	(1.791)

**Note:** Results of three separate OLS regression run with a dummy variable for migrant communes. Peasants in migrant communes = % peasants in these communes, and 0 if otherwise. Peasants in high migrant communes = % peasant \* % migrant, and 0 if otherwise. Same applies to landless and artisans.