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Allocating Priority with Auctions: An Experimental Analysis

Noussair, Charles N. and Porter, David (1990) Allocating Priority with Auctions: An Experimental Analysis. Social Science Working Paper, 747. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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There are many examples of markets where resources that were allocated ex-ante must be rationed ex-post. Two alternative methods of rationing are considered in this paper: priority service (see Chao and Wilson [1987] and Wilson [1989]) and proportional rationing (see Spulber [1989]). An experimental environment is developed in which the two rules are implemented within two well known institutions, the English and the Uniform Price sealed bid Auctions, under two different information conditions. We find that priority service generates more efficient allocations than proportional rationing, the sealed bid auction performed better than the English and that that both mechanisms and rationing rules were more efficient when there was a lack of common information.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:We would like to thank Daniel Spulber and participants at the Economic Science Association meetings in 1989 for their helpful suggestions. We would especially like to thank John Ledyard for many valuable comments. Published as Noussair, Charles, and David Porter. "Allocating priority with auctions: an experimental analysis." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 19, no. 2 (1992): 169-195.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:experimental economics, auctions, assignment, priority pricing, rationing
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:747
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-150636801
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81044
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:31 Aug 2017 22:19
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:38

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