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An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Camerer, Colin F. and Porter, David (1990) An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games. Social Science Working Paper, 740. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-160114059

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Abstract

This paper investigates the refinements of Nash equilibrium in two person signaling game experiments. The experimental games cover the watershed of the nested refinements: Bayes-Nash, Sequential, Intuitive, Divine, Universally Divine, NWBR, and Stabel. In each game an equilibrium selection problem is defined in which adjacent refinements are considered. The pattern of outcomes suggest that individuals select the more refined equilibria up to the divinity concept. However, an anomaly occurs in the game in which the stable equilibrium is a clear preference among the subjects. Since the concepts are nested this suggests that the outcomes are game specific. Sender behavior does not seem to follow any specific decision rule (e.g., Nash, minmax, PIR, etc.) while receiver actions tend to correspond to the Nash equilibrium outcomes.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-093516207Related ItemPublished Version
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Camerer, Colin F.0000-0003-4049-1871
Additional Information:We are indebted to Mark Olson for help in statistical analysis and programming. Audiences at Washington University, University of Arizona, University of Houston, and University of Pennsylvania provided helpful comments. This research was partially funded by the Wharton Risk and Decision Processes Center. Support for the second author was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES 87-08566). Published as Banks, Jeffrey and Camerer, Colin and Porter, David (1994) An Experimental Analysis of Nash Refinements in Signaling Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 6 (1). pp. 1-31.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-8708566
Wharton Risk and Decision Processes CenterUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:Game Theory, Nash Refinements, Experimental Economics, Signaling Games
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:740
Classification Code:JEL: 026, 215
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-160114059
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170831-160114059
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81052
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:01 Sep 2017 17:27
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:38

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