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Equilibria Resistant to Mutation

Boylan, Richard T. (1990) Equilibria Resistant to Mutation. Social Science Working Paper, 729. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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The paper requires that equilibrium behavior for two person symmetric games be resistant to genetic evolution. In particular the paper assumes that the evolution of genotypes selecting a behavioral rule can be described according to some generalization of the replicator model. This paper defines an equilibrium concept, 'evolutionary equilibrium', which is defined as the limit of stationary points of the evolutionary process as the proportion of the population that mutates goes to zero. Then the set of evolutionary equilibria, as defined in the paper, is a nonempty subset of the set of perfect equilibria (and thus of the set of Nash equilibria) and a superset of the set of regular equilibria and the set of ESS.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:The author thanks Richard McKelvey for helpful comments and many enlightening discussions. Comments by Kim Border and George Mailath on earlier drafts were also helpful. Financial support provided by the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Fellowship and the Alfred P. Sloan Dissertation Fellowship is duly appreciated.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:729
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-133545488
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81081
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:05 Sep 2017 23:57
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:38

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