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Voter Preference for Trade Policy Instruments

Mayer, Wolfgang and Reizman, Raymond G. (1990) Voter Preference for Trade Policy Instruments. Social Science Working Paper, 722. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-142822107

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Abstract

We analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Comments by Jagdish Bhagwati, Dani Rodrick, and participants in the Columbia Conference on Political Economy and International Economics, as well as by Costas Syropoulos and seminar participants at Pennsylvania State University and the University of Western Ontario are greatly appreciated. Published as Mayer, Wolfgang, and Raymond Riezman. "Voter preferences for trade policy instruments." Economics & Politics 2, no. 3 (1990): 259-273.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:722
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-142822107
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-142822107
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81094
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:05 Sep 2017 23:43
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:38

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