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Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Compliance: A Strategic Analysis

Graetz, Michael J. and Reinganum, Jennifer F. and Wilde, Louis L. (1989) Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Compliance: A Strategic Analysis. Social Science Working Paper, 710. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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In this paper we examine the incentives for taxpayers to claim risky deductions and to solicit expert opinions to support their positions, and for the tax agency to distinguish among individuals who do and do not solicit expert opinions for the purposes of auditing. We also consider the implications of an ex ante constraint on the tax agency which requires it to treat all taxpayers who take the deduction alike in terms of audit rates, whether or not they solicit an expert opinion. Finally, we examine the effects of regulations which limit the degree of riskiness for which a supporting opinion can be justified as well as the effects of changes in various penalty rates.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:Revised version. Original dated to July 1988. Professor Graetz thanks the National Science Foundation for research support (grant no. SES-870443) as do Professors Reinganum and Wilde (grant nos. SES-8903157 and SES-8902545).
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:710
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-153557344
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81106
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:05 Sep 2017 23:24
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:38

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