A Caltech Library Service

How to gerrymander: A formal analysis

Sherstyuk, Katerina (1998) How to gerrymander: A formal analysis. Public Choice, 95 (1/2). pp. 27-49. ISSN 0048-5829. doi:10.1023/A:1004986314885.

Full text is not posted in this repository. Consult Related URLs below.

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item:


The paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the “fair cake division” results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. We analyze existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, we find that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness.

Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription ReadCube access ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Accepted 14 November 1995. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. I would like to thank Peter Bardsley, Marcus Berliant, Kim Border, Morgan Kousser and Richard McKelvey for their suggestions and helpful discussion of this paper. Any errors are my own.
Issue or Number:1/2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-080819996
Persistent URL:
Official Citation:Sherstyuk, K. Public Choice (1998) 95: 27.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81120
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:05 Sep 2017 20:43
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:41

Repository Staff Only: item control page