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Allocating priority with auctions: An Experimental Analysis

Noussair, Charles and Porter, David (1992) Allocating priority with auctions: An Experimental Analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 19 (2). pp. 169-195. ISSN 0167-2681. doi:10.1016/0167-2681(92)90089-T.

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There are many examples of markets where resources that were allocated ex ante must be rationed ex post. Two alternative methods of rationing are considered in this paper: Priority Service [see Chao and Wilson (American Economic Review 77, 1987) and Wilson (Econometrica 57, 1989)] and Proportional Rationing [see Spulber (International Economic Review 33, 1992)]. An experimental environment is developed in which the two rules are implemented within two well known institutions, the English and the Uniform Price Sealed Bid Auctions, under two different information conditions. We find that Priority Service generates more efficient allocations than Proportional Rationing, and the Sealed Bid Auction performs better than the English. Both mechanisms and rationing rules are more efficient when there is a lack of common information.

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Additional Information:© 1992 Elsevier B.V. Received October 1990, final version received August 1991. We would like to thank Daniel Spulber, an anonymous referee, and participants at the Economic Science Association meetings in 1989 for their helpful suggestions. We would especially like to thank John Ledyard for many valuable comments.
Issue or Number:2
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-112137032
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Official Citation:Charles Noussair, David Porter, Allocating priority with auctions: An experimental analysis, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 19, Issue 2, October 1992, Pages 169-195, ISSN 0167-2681, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81137
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:05 Sep 2017 18:34
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:41

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