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Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1989) Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication. Social Science Working Paper, 693. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-143503727

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Abstract

This paper studies the problem of designing efficient trading mechanisms when players may engage in pre-play communication. It is well known that equilibrium behavior can be affected, sometimes drastically, if players have the opportunity to exchange messages prior to playing some particular game. We investigate the relationship between efficiency, pre-play communication, and unique implementation. We identify a class of simple mechanisms which are immune to pre-play communication and show that any incentive efficient allocation can be uniquely implemented by such a mechanism.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-140227182Related ItemPublished Version
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:Published as Palfrey, Thomas R., and Sanjay Srivastava. "Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication." Journal of Economic Theory 55, no. 1 (1991): 17-40.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:693
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-143503727
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-143503727
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81152
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:05 Sep 2017 22:26
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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