Published December 1988
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
Open
A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law
Creators
Abstract
A famous stylized fact in comparative politics, Duverger' s Law, is that electoral systems based on single ballot winner-take-all plurality voting will produce bipartisan competition. This paper presents an equilibrium model of elections in which this stylized fact emerges a logical implication of rational strategic voting behavior by individuals in a large heterogeneous electorate.
Additional Information
The author would like to thank the National Science Foundation for financial support. This paper was prepared for delivery at the "Economic Theories of Politics" conference in Haifa, Israel, June 1988, and has benefited from discussions with Bruce Cain, John Ledyard, and Richard McKelvey.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp688.pdf
Files
sswp688.pdf
Files
(671.0 kB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:0a5018ac16d0ac912d2ec1668b1c5e41
|
671.0 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 81155
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-145247491
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-143351276 (URL)
Dates
- Created
-
2017-09-05Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-11-22Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 688