Palfrey, Thomas R. (1988) A Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law. Social Science Working Paper, 688. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-145247491
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Abstract
A famous stylized fact in comparative politics, Duverger' s Law, is that electoral systems based on single ballot winner-take-all plurality voting will produce bipartisan competition. This paper presents an equilibrium model of elections in which this stylized fact emerges a logical implication of rational strategic voting behavior by individuals in a large heterogeneous electorate.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | The author would like to thank the National Science Foundation for financial support. This paper was prepared for delivery at the "Economic Theories of Politics" conference in Haifa, Israel, June 1988, and has benefited from discussions with Bruce Cain, John Ledyard, and Richard McKelvey. | ||||||
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
| Issue or Number: | 688 | ||||||
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-145247491 | ||||||
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170905-145247491 | ||||||
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
| ID Code: | 81155 | ||||||
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
| Deposited On: | 05 Sep 2017 22:21 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 22 Nov 2019 09:58 |
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