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In recent years, thinking about the American Presidential primaries has been dominated by the image of Carter's victory in 1976. Conventional wisdom in the eighties has advised Presidential candidates to focus on the early contests in Iowa and New Hampshire, and to at least match, or better yet, exceed the expectations that the press, pollsters, and pundits have for them in those states. The successful campaign, it was thought, had to force the competition out by the end of March in order to lock up the nomination before the convention.¹ This common wisdom — the so-called "momentum theory" — will now have to be revised as a result of what happened in the 1988 primaries. While one candidate from each party did eventually emerge victorious in 1988, no one followed the Carter script as closely as expected. The Democratic race was not clearly resolved until Dukakis managed consecutive victories over Jackson in Wisconsin (April 5), New York (April 19) and Pennsylvania (April 26). On the Republican side, even though the race was over after SuperTuesday, the conventional "momentum" story was still marred by the odd—and in the end, meaningless—outcome in Iowa Republican caucuses. Bush exceeded expectations in Iowa, but in a negative direction, and both Dole and Robertson were unable to convert their successes into any advantage in New Hampshire and the South.

In this paper, we use data from a series of 12 exit polls conducted by the *Los Angeles Times* to explain the course of the 1988 Democratic and Republican presidential primary campaigns. The Los Angeles Times sample of primaries includes the critical early Democratic and Republican contests in Iowa and New Hampshire, six SuperTuesday states, and the Democratic primaries in Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania and California. The story we tell is quite simple. Momentum in both races was slowed by regionalism, and in the Democratic contest specifically, by the

1. See, for instance, Larry Bartels, *Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988; John Aldrich, *Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices in Presidential Nomination Campaigns*; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980; Gary R. GIBEN and Nelson W. Polsby, (eds.) *Media and Momentum*; New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987.

non-strategic support that blacks and affluent liberal whites gave Jesse Jackson. Momentum accelerated in the New York and Pennsylvania primaries as moderate and Jewish voters strategically switched to Dukakis in order to block Jesse Jackson's nomination. Both Bush and Dukakis staked out positions for themselves near the center of the ideological spectrum in their respective parties. As it turned out, the distribution of voter preferences, combined with strategic complications typical of multicandidate races, served to make the middle an advantageous spot for the victorious candidates.

IDEOLOGY IN THE 1988 PRIMARIES

Primary voters in American primary elections tend to be more partisan and ideological than general election voters.² Moreover, since primaries pit candidates from the same party against one another, partisan appeals are necessarily ineffective, forcing candidates to try to distinguish themselves on some other basis, such as ideology or policy. However, this too is frequently difficult. The range of policy differences among candidates in a primary field is often quite narrow while the number of candidates — at least, in the early stages when the candidates first stake out their ideological positions — can be large.

Nonetheless, in 1988, the candidates of both parties managed to establish discernible ideological identities. On the Democratic side, Jesse Jackson and Paul Simon took uncompromisingly liberal positions on most issues. Bruce Babbitt and Michael Dukakis, by comparison moderated their liberalism with concessions to fiscal austerity. Richard Gephardt and Albert Gore advocated a harder line on defense issues and seemed to claim a more conservative position although it is difficult to characterize Gephardt's stance on trade policy as either liberal or conservative. On the Republican side, Jack Kemp and Pat Robertson stood on the far right, steadfast in their support of the conservative agenda on social, economic and foreign policy issues. George Bush wrapped himself up in the mantle of Ronald Reagan, but seemed more moderate due, perhaps, to the memory of his 1980 campaign, or to the fact that the Reagan administration itself seemed moderate in comparison with Kemp and Robertson. Robert Dole, in contrast, had distanced himself from Reagan during the Iran-Contra scandal and declined to sign a pledge not to raise taxes. Though the policy differences between Dole and Bush were very minor, Dole's independence appealed to those in the moderate wing of the party (and independents and Democrats as well). The differences between the candidates of different parties were, of course, greater than those within each party: no Democratic candidate, for instance, could be considered to the right of any Republican. Even so, there were still significant differences along a liberal-conservative dimension between the various candidates within both parties, differences which structured the policy debates in the 1988 primaries.

2. Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*; 6th Edition New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984, Chapter 3.

The distribution of voters within each party on a liberal–conservative dimension was as different as that of the candidates. In none of the Democratic primaries, including the south, did more than 8 percent of the voters describe themselves as "very conservative," while in the Republican primaries between 15 and 24 percent of the voters placed themselves in the far right category. Likewise, between 2 and 4 percent of the Republicans described themselves as "very liberal" compared to at least 10 percent in each of the Democratic primaries. The median respondent in each of the Republican primaries was "somewhat conservative." In the Democratic primaries, the median respondent was either "moderate" or "somewhat liberal." It is safe to locate the median voter in the Democratic primaries a bit to the left of center and the median voter in Republican primaries as quite a bit to the right of center, though probably not far right. In the electorate as a whole the median voter lies near the center of the ideological spectrum.

[Insert Table 1 here]

Another noteworthy feature of Table 1 is that the ideological distribution within the parties seems to vary by state. On the Democratic side, the South especially, and Illinois to a lesser extent, had fewer liberal voters. Only one third of the Southern Democrats identified themselves as liberal or very liberal, for instance, as opposed to 49% of New Hampshire Democrats and 48% of New York Democrats. In no state, however, did a majority of Democrats identify themselves as liberals. Our sample of Republican states is smaller, but there were some significant differences — Illinois Republicans were considerably less conservative than Republicans in Iowa. Interestingly, Southern Republican voters in 1988 were not distinctively more conservative than those in Iowa and New Hampshire as were their Democratic counterparts. In general, the ideological configuration was more complex for Democratic than Republican candidates. While Democratic candidates in 1988 had to adapt to very different distributions of opinion as they progressed through the sequence of primaries, Republican candidates did not need to contend with as much ideological heterogeneity.

Voting in the 1988 primaries consistently followed ideological lines. The evidence relating ideological self–placement to primary voting is presented in Tables 2a and 2b. In every state except Illinois Dukakis won a plurality of the "somewhat liberal" vote. Gephardt and Gore each did better among "moderate" and "somewhat conservative" voters (by as much as twenty points) than among liberal voters. Jackson and Simon support was generally strongest among "very liberal" voters. On the Republican side, Kemp and Robertson support grew with the conservatism of the voter: it was negligible among liberal voters, stronger among moderates, stronger still among moderate conservatives, and often a plurality among very conservative voters. For Dole the pattern was reversed. Dole, despite his conservative voting record in the Senate and his loyal service as majority leader, could muster only modest support among conservatives. He fared well among moderates, but it turned out there weren't enough moderates in the Republican primaries to defeat Bush who, in every state but Iowa, swept the "somewhat conservative" category.

[Insert Tables 2a and 2b here]

In two-candidate races, the median is the most advantageous location for a candidate.³ If voters decide solely on the basis of ideology, the median defeats any other position. However, the situation is much more complicated in multi-candidate elections since a candidate adopting the position of the median voter can be "squeezed" out by candidates on either side.⁴ Indeed, this was a real possibility in the 1988 presidential primaries. On the Democratic side, if either Jackson or Simon could have consistently captured the far left vote and either Gephardt or Gore could have consistently captured the moderate vote, Dukakis would have been left with only a share of the "somewhat liberal" vote and probably would have come up short. As it happened, Gephardt and Gore split the moderate Democratic vote, and both had dropped out by the time Jackson had overtaken Simon as the candidate of the left. Instead of being squeezed out, Dukakis was left peacefully in the middle as other candidates—two on both sides of him—fought over fairly narrow shares of vote in each wing. The Republican race was not altogether different. Robertson and Kemp split the very conservative vote, leaving Bush with no strong challenge from his right. Dole did not face any competition on the left, but he was unable to win the moderate vote decisively enough to overcome Bush's support from the right.

Even though the median can be a dangerous spot in a multicandidate election, what we show in subsequent sections is that a variety of other factors—region, race, religion—worked to the advantage of the median candidates in 1988 by weakening their opponents to the right and left. It should be said, however, that there were a few notable exceptions to the patterns described above. First, Dukakis and Simon in Illinois received a higher percentage of votes from moderates and moderate conservatives than from liberals. The apparent reason for this reversal of the expected relationship is that Jackson's presence as a viable candidate on the left forced moderate and conservative Democrats to coalesce around any candidate to the right of Jackson, no matter how objectionable. Second, in a number of states (Iowa, the south, Illinois) Bush's overall strength was unrelated to ideological identification. Of course, Bush's support relative to Dole did vary by the voter's position so it cannot be said that ideology was unimportant in the Republican race.

In summary, although the unlying ideological orientation of the two parties differed measurably, both the Democratic and Republican contests featured candidates on the left, middle and right of their respective constituencies. The "middle" for Democrats was considerably to the left of that for Republicans, but in both parties there was a considerable middle and it was from here that the victorious candidates emerged. There was nothing inevitable, however, about the primaries producing candidates near each party's median, as in both parties there were strong candidates on either flank. We must turn to a variety of nonideological factors to explain the eventual success of the centrist candidates.

3. Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*; New York: Harper and Row, 1957, Chapter 8.

4. *Ibid.*, pp.47–9.

DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Presidential primaries are a part of a complex coalition building process. Coalitions are usually described in terms of the demographic characteristics of voters and it is to an analysis of such factors that we now turn. In the appendix, we present a series of equations explaining voting in each state's primary. The choice probabilities are of the multinomial logit form with the implicit dependent variable in each equation being the log odds of choosing the specified candidate over either Bush or Dukakis. Candidates who did not mount serious campaigns in a particular state's primary were eliminated from the model so the set of candidates varies from state to state. The choice probabilities are a function of ideology (liberal, moderate or conservative), occupational status (white collar or blue collar), education (those with some college attendance distinguished from those without), gender, religion (Catholic or non-Catholic or, in some states, Jewish), union membership, and race (white, black, Hispanic, or Asian).

In the Democratic primaries, one notices a variety of cleavages in the primary electorate. We discuss support for Jackson in more detail below, but, in broad outline, Jackson supporters can be divided into two groups: blacks (and other nonwhites) and very liberal, well-educated whites. Both groups have been loyal Democratic supporters in recent presidential elections. Gore and Gephardt, on the other hand, drew support from more marginal Democratic voters: conservative and southern blue-collar workers without college educations. It was, of course, Jimmy Carter's success in attracting the support of such voters in 1976 that gave the Democrats their only victory in a presidential election over the past quarter century. Michael Dukakis did score well however, among Catholics and union members. The support for Dukakis among Catholics is particularly strong. In most states, being Catholic increases the probability of voting for Dukakis over Jackson by between 15 and 20 percent and over Gore by between 8 and 15 percent. Dukakis did well among college-educated voters (though relatively less well than either Jackson or Simon) without repelling the less well educated (who were usually only 5 to 10 percent more likely to support Gore or Gephardt). Also, Dukakis ran consistently better among women.

In the Republican primaries, the electorate is more homogeneous and the demographic cleavages much less apparent. On Super Tuesday, Dole drew greater support among white-collar college educated voters than Bush, but the opposite was the case in Iowa. There was a small but persistent pro-Dole bias in the female in the Republican primaries. Bush did relatively well among the small number of union members voting in the Republican primaries, but there was little indication in the primary data of how Bush would fare among the blue-collar whites in November.

ISSUES AND CANDIDATE SUPPORT

The *LA Times* also asked a series of questions on specific issues that allow us to identify more precisely the policy matters of importance in the 1988 primaries. These items cover a broad range of issues—economic, social and foreign policy. Each item is in the form of a statement to which respondents can indicate their agreement. Failure to agree can indicate either no opinion or

disagreement so these items must be interpreted with caution. In table 3 we have presented the percentage of each candidate's voters who agree with each statement. Table 3 also included the percentage of Republicans, white white-collar (ww) and white blue-collar (wb) democrats, Hispanic democrats, and black democrats agreeing with each statement. The white blue-collar democrats are a particularly important swing group in American Presidential elections, providing considerable support for Reagan in both 1980 and 1984.

[Insert Table 3 here]

Economic policy debates centered on the budget. Should taxes be raised? Should there be more domestic spending? Should defense spending be cut? There was very little support for a tax increase among either Democrats or Republicans in 1988. The only group exhibiting any support for a tax increase was the white white-collar Democrat and even then it was far from a majority (27 percent of them). On spending matters, there was a greater divergence of opinion between the parties. Half of the upper-class white Democrats favored more domestic spending compared to less than a quarter of the Republicans. The blue-collar white Democrats on this issue, as on many others, fell somewhere between these two groups. The typical Jackson and Simon votes were more likely to favor and the Gephardt and Gore voters were less likely to favor additional domestic spending. On the Republican side, Dole voters were a bit more likely than other voters to support additional domestic spending, but overall Republican support was very low. In general, domestic spending was an issue that divided the Democratic and Republican parties from each other much more than it divided the members of each party. In contrast, defense cuts were a divisive issue for the Democrats. Between only 17 and 26 percent of the Republicans favored any reduction of defense spending (with Dole voters slightly more likely to be supportive than the others) but among Democrats, there was a schism between white collar and blue collar whites with the former favoring and the latter opposing defense cuts. Gore and Gephardt voters were more conservative on defense issues, which made them tempting targets for the Republicans in the November campaign.

Republican attitudes on defense spending were manifestations of a general conservatism on foreign policy. Between 32 and 42 percent of Republican primary voters supported aid for the Nicaraguan Contras compared to fewer than 16 percent support among any of the Democratic groups. Among Democratic voters, supporters of Gore and Gephardt were more likely to favor Contra aid. Among Republican voters, there was uniform support in 1988 for Contra aid except among Dole supporters, who exhibited their usual moderation. Partisan differences over the INF treaty were less distinct. Upper class white Democrats were more supportive of the INF treaty than Republicans while Black, Hispanic and blue-collar white Democrats were less supportive. These differences may have only reflected lower levels of familiarity with the treaty and, in any event, the issue did not appear to be a significant factor in explaining voting in the Democratic primaries. The INF treaty did, however, appear to have some influence on voting in the Republican primaries :e.g., Robertson voters were significantly less likely to support it than those who voted for the other Republican candidates.

Debate over social issues was less contentious in 1988 than in prior years, but traditional divisions over issues like abortion and AIDS testing conformed to what in recent years have been customary patterns. Republicans were much more likely to support a ban on abortions and mandatory AIDS testing than Democrats although, as usual, blue-collar white Democrats fell somewhere in the middle on this issue. Social issues provide us with somewhat more purchase on vote choice in the Republican primaries. Robertson supporters were the least likely to take a pro-choice position on abortion and the most willing to institute mandatory AIDS testing of all Republican voters. Bush and Dole supporters did not differ much on social issues while Kemp supporters fell inbetween. Much of Robertson's success, such as it was, can be attributed to his ability to capitalize on various social concerns of the religious right. This deprived Kemp of much of his natural constituency, leaving Bush with a candidate much weaker in other respects to his right.

REGIONALISM AND THE SLOWING OF MOMENTUM

Both Dukakis and Bush succeeded in 1988 in spite of defeat in the Iowa primary. Their opponents were unable to carry "momentum" into the New Hampshire primaries. Why was this so? No doubt the size of the field, the blandness of the candidates, strategic mistakes and the like all played a role in 1988, but one critical factor was regionalism. We mean by this that various candidates in both parties ran to some degree on regional themes and were rewarded with higher levels of electoral support across the board in primaries on their "home turf." Regionalism mattered in two ways. It mattered first because it affected the results in the "home" primaries. Gephardt, coming from Missouri, won the Iowa caucuses with 31 percent and later his home state with 58 percent of the vote. Simon, from Illinois, finished second in nearby Iowa (with 27 percent) and also won his home state. Dukakis won neighboring New Hampshire (36 percent of the vote) and every other state in New England, except the low turnout Democratic caucus in Vermont. And, of course, Gore who ran as the southern candidate on Super Tuesday, carried Tennessee, Kentucky, North Carolina, Arkansas and Oklahoma, but exhibited little strength elsewhere. Even on the Republican side, Dole's strongest showing came in the Midwest caucus states (Minnesota, Kansas and Iowa).

Regionalism may have also mattered in a second sense—namely that "home" victories did not have much impact on other states. The successes of Dole, Gephardt and Simon in Iowa did not carry over into New Hampshire. Gore was unable to turn a strong (and better than expected) showing in the South into any victories after March 8. Even in the case of Dukakis, it was not New Hampshire, but rather Florida, Texas and New York that seemed to be more crucial to his eventual success. Candidates are normally expected to do better on their home turf, so it is not surprising that the victories of Dole and Gephardt in Iowa, Dukakis in New Hampshire, and Gore on Super Tuesday did not generate much momentum. But, by dampening the informational value and muddling the significance of a victory, regionalism slowed the winnowing process and delayed the emergence of a single nominee.

What evidence is there of regionalism? We present two kinds. The first comes from a question that the LA Times repeated in every primary asking voters to identify the reasons for why

they supported the candidate that they did (see Table 4). In the Iowa Republican caucus, voters who mentioned the experience of their candidate were more or less evenly divided between Bush and Dole (46 percent for Dole, 42 percent for Bush). Those who referred to leadership or to the prospect of the candidate getting the job done preferred Dole to Bush by about a two-to-one margin. But among the 15 percent who mentioned that the candidate was "from the midwest and understands our problems," Dole had the edge on Bush 95 percent to 3 percent. Of course, since Bush had no significant link by either birth or residency to the midwest, one wouldn't expect Bush voters to cite regional connections. Nonetheless, 38 percent of Dole voters did cite this as a reason for their vote. Additionally, 18 percent of the voters spoke of their preferred candidate's ability to "care about people like me," and they preferred Dole to Bush by almost a five to one margin.

[Insert Table 4 here]

A similar story can be told about the Democratic primary in Iowa. Gephardt, who worked very hard to identify himself with regional issues and concerns, was the leading candidate in only two categories: empathy ("seems to care about people like us") and being from the midwest. By comparison, Dukakis was the first choice of those who mentioned leadership and efficiency, and Simon was first among those who valued trust and experience (although he was second to Gephardt among those who gave being from midwest as a reason). Altogether, as Table 4 shows, region was mentioned by 46 percent of Gephardt's supporters in Iowa, 22 percent of Simon's and 38 percent of Dole's. On the Republican side, regional factors were probably not major determinants for Bush in the New Hampshire and Super Tuesday Republican primaries (even though Bush claimed a residence in both Maine and Texas), suggesting, perhaps, that in politics, unlike the real estate business, two homes are not better than one. On the Democratic side, regional factors continued to affect the outcome even after Iowa. Thirty percent of Dukakis's supporters mentioned that he was from New England and understood their problems. Dukakis was also preferred by the 27 percent who claimed that they voted the way that they did because the candidate "seems to care about people like me."

Given the intent of Super Tuesday, it is not surprising to find that regionalism was also mentioned by 8 percent of Democratic voters and 18 percent of those who voted for Gore on March 8, and that Gore was second only to Jackson among the 21 percent who mentioned empathy with the region as a reason for voting they way that they did. Corroborating our new found law about multiple homes, Jackson got relatively small advantages in the south and Illinois for his regional connections to those areas. Illinois was the last significant primary in which regionalism was evident according to this measure, benefitting Simon and, belatedly, Dole.

A second, more sophisticated test of the same phenomenon comes from the equation in Table A2 in the appendix. Here we have combined the data from all of the exit polls in order to obtain an estimate of the effects of regional affiliation on primary voting. Being from the same region as a candidate is estimated to increase one's probability of voting for that candidate by between 9 and 13 percent (depending upon one's inclination to support the candidate for other

reasons). The effect is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) and does not reflect the influence of other factors, such as race, class or ideology, that are controlled for in the equation.

If the data suggest that regionalism was a sometimes decisive factor in 1988, the question is, "Why?" The first explanation is that Reagan's economic policies had different effects on different sectors of the economy and regions of the country and this was reflected in political behavior. Elsewhere, one of us has argued that Reagan's highly popular presidency was due less to his teflon personality than to robust economic conditions.⁵ However, not all parts of the economy have prospered during this period. Farmers in the midwest, residents in oil producing regions such as the southwest, and workers in rustbelt industries threatened by foreign competition have not shared fully in the recovery of the past five years, and this caused discontent in some areas that Reagan carried in the last election.

One possibility, therefore, is that varying sectoral economic conditions fueled regionalism in 1988. Midwestern voters were anxious about their farm economy and threats to manufacturing from overseas competition. Among Republican voters in the Iowa primary, farm policy was third in issue salience (mentioned by one fifth of the voters), and the majority of those who thought that it was important (58 percent) preferred Dole to all the other candidates and over Bush, in particular, by a six to one margin. Farm policy was among the top three issues for the Iowa Democrats, and those for whom farm policy was salient preferred Gephardt to any other candidate by more than three to one. Foreign trade was also considered an important issue by nearly a fifth of the Democrats, and they too favored Gephardt over the others by at least two to one.

However, voters in the east and south did not exhibit the same sectoral economic concerns that preoccupied voters in the midwest. Farm issues were barely discussed outside the midwest and foreign trade was mentioned by only 11 percent of the Democrats and by 14 percent and 8 percent of the Republicans in New Hampshire and the south respectively. In the latter case, Dole's advantage on these issues in Iowa went over to Bush by New Hampshire and SuperTuesday, and in Gephardt's case, Gore took the voters with trade concerns in the South. In other words, even when the foreign trade and farm issues remained salient, the midwestern candidate did not always benefit.

Aside from the economic basis of regionalism, another reason it may have played so prominent a role in 1988 has to do with the incentives arising from conventional momentum theory. If it is true that early victories are the key and that the race is over before it gets to states like Indiana, Ohio and California, then it is natural for those with a home base in the early primary states to think that they might have a leg up on the opposition. Midwestern candidates had a name recognition advantage in Iowa that helped distinguish them from the large field of relatively unknown candidates. On the Democratic side, the candidates with the highest name recognition in Iowa were the two who had run for the nomination in 1984 (Hart 93% and Jackson 92%). Among

5. D. Roderick Kiewiet and Doug Rivers, "The Economic Basis of Reagan's Appeal," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (eds.) *The New Direction in American Politics*; Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985.

the rest, the order was Gephardt (84%), Simon (82%), Dukakis (78%), Babbitt (70%) and Gore (64%). Bush (92%) and Pat Robertson (91%), the TV evangelist, had the highest levels of name recognition among the Republican candidates. However, among the rest, Senator Dole from Kansas, was the leader (86%), followed by Haig (84%), Kemp (75%) and Dupont (65%).

Since the perspectives in the different regions were not similar, voters in a sense learned less from the results of the Iowa caucuses than they had in the past. Not all strong showings at the polls were equal in the eyes of the press and the public, who tended instead to discount home turf victories and to play up victories that demonstrated broad appeal (hence, the fuss over Jackson's victories in Michigan and Vermont, and Dukakis's victories in Texas and Wisconsin). The failure of regional strategies in 1988 may discourage a recurrence of this phenomenon in 1992.

THE JACKSON CANDIDACY

A critical factor in the slowing of momentum during the 1988 Democratic Primary was the strong showing by Jesse Jackson. In 1984, entering late and without the united support of the Black community, Jackson won only two primaries and 18 percent of the vote. By contrast, at the end of the 1988 campaign, Jackson had finished second to Dukakis, winning seven primaries (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia) and 29 percent of the primary vote. Building on his Super Tuesday performance (where he won most of the votes overall), Jackson was the only credible obstacle to Dukakis' nomination up to the New York primary.

In the period between March 8 and April 19, Jackson won the caucuses in Alaska (March 10), South Carolina (March 12), and Michigan (March 26), and finished ahead of Dukakis in the Illinois primary (March 15), and got nearly one third of the vote in the predominantly white Connecticut (March 29) and Wisconsin (April 5) primaries. It was only after New York and Pennsylvania that Dukakis's victory seemed assured.

What was behind Jackson's improvement over 1984? Two kinds of explanations are plausible. The first is institutional, centering on such factors as the consequences of the Fairness Commission and the creation of a Super Tuesday primary in the South. The Fairness Commission was created after the 1984 campaign in response to Jackson's contention that the rules unfairly penalized his candidacy and aided Walter Mondale's. Jackson called for an end to winner-take-all primaries, bonuses and caucuses on the grounds that they denied all contenders other than the front-runner their fair share of delegates. Pointing to the fact that he received only 12 percent of the delegates in return for his 18 percent of the vote in 1984, Jackson argued that anything but proportional representation was unfair in two senses—unfair because it rewarded the front-runner with an artificial lead over the other contenders, and unfair because it affected "momentum" by altering people's perceptions of credibility based on delegate shares.

In the end, the Democratic party was reluctant to change its rules once again, and the Fairness Commission, headed by Donald Fowler of South Carolina (not Jackson's choice for the job), recommended only a few amendments to the procedures such as a lowering of the threshold needed to win delegates from 20 to 15 percent and a repeal of the rule that delegate selection events had to be closed to non-party members. Despite this, Jackson did well in 1988, achieving proportional shares of the delegates under the same rules he opposed in 1984. Only in the direct election primaries (i.e., loophole primaries) was he systematically penalized in his 1988 delegate share (e.g., Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland).

If the minor changes of the Fairness Commission seem unlikely explanations for Jackson's success in 1988, the creation of Super Tuesday may have done more. Prior to 1988, there were two schools of thought about the potential impact that Super Tuesday might have on Jackson's campaign. The first maintained that because the Southern primaries in 1984 were held on different days and, for the most part, late in the spring, Jackson would be unable to capitalize on his southern strength. By bundling the Southern contests together and placing them earlier in the primary calendar, many thought that Jackson would get the kind of electoral boost from Super Tuesday that could make him a candidate to be reckoned with in 1988.

The opposing theory, espoused by Charles Robb of Virginia, conceded that Jackson would do well in the south, but predicted that Jackson would not be advantaged by the Super Tuesday format. Jackson, he maintained, had benefited in 1984 from the low 1984 turnout in the South and, he reasoned, heightened interest in the campaign and higher turnout caused by the new format would drop Jackson's vote in 1988.⁶ With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that Super Tuesday did in fact help Jackson, but the Robb hypothesis was not completely wrong: Jackson's share of the 1988 vote dropped in four Southern states from what it had been in 1984 (Louisiana, due to the peculiar circumstances of its 1984 primary, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas—all states critical to Gore's brief, but significant, elevation to the top rung of candidates). Robb's prediction, as a whole, was undone by Jackson's substantial gains in states like Mississippi, Virginia, Georgia and Alabama.

Institutional factors—the change in the threshold requirement change, perhaps, and the Super Tuesday format to a greater extent—may have boosted Jackson's candidacy to a degree, but even before Super Tuesday, Jackson had exceeded his 1984 performance in the largely all-white states of Iowa, New Hampshire and, especially, Vermont (going from 8 percent to 26 percent). In other words, there were signs even before Super Tuesday of an important behavioral change: namely, that Jackson was doing better than before at attracting highly liberal, well-educated white voters in addition to his loyal core of black voters. This was not exactly the Rainbow coalition that Jackson had envisioned in 1984. Rather it was as much a black and white marble cake with parts that coalesced but did not mix. To affluent white liberals, Jackson was the only true standard bearer of the left, especially after Simon's candidacy faltered. To black voters, Jackson was one of their

6. See "The '88 Calendar May Give Jackson a Boost," *Congressional Quarterly*, May 9, 1987, p. 2387 and "Will 'Super Tuesday' Rules Mean Southern Trouble?," *Congressional Quarterly*, May 9, 1987, p. 879.

own who understood and spoke eloquently about the black community's struggle with drugs, crime and poverty.

The upscale profile of Jackson's white supporters was widely noted by the press. A perusal of the logit estimates in the appendix shows that the odds of voting for Jackson versus Dukakis were positively and significantly enhanced by being college educated in nearly all of the states the Times polled in. A corollary to this is that Jackson ran well in areas with large numbers of college students. Jackson also tended to do better among white-collar than blue-collar whites. For instance, the estimates in the appendix show Gephardt in Iowa and Gore in the south did better than Jackson with blue-collar whites. Even after Gephardt and Gore dropped out, Jackson was unable to gain any particular advantage over Dukakis among blue-collar white voters (see the Pennsylvania and California equations). Needless to say, our data indicate clearly that the core of Jackson's support was black. Jackson received over 90 percent of the black vote in every state polled by the LA Times, and the coefficients in the Jackson equation reflect this dramatically.

Why did Jackson get the upscale white-collar white rather than the blue-collar white Democratic vote? The answer lies in the left wing appeal of the Jackson campaign. In Table 2, which shows the distribution of Democratic vote by self-identified ideological placement, we saw earlier that Jackson was the first choice of the very liberal voters in every state polled except New Hampshire and Pennsylvania. Moreover, the coefficients on the ideology variables in the various equations in the appendix indicate that, controlling for demographic factors, the odds of voting for Jackson increased as one went from being a conservative to a moderate to a liberal. Jackson attracted left-wing votes and the white left in the Democratic party tends to be college-educated, white-collar—not working class.

Another piece of evidence on this point can be found in Table 3, which displays at the bottom the proportion of white white-collar Democrats, white blue-collar Democrats, Hispanic Democrats, Black Democrats and Republicans who favored various issue positions. On almost every item in all three regions for which we have comparable questions, white-collar white Democrats, were more likely than blue-collar white Democrats to favor aid for abortions, oppose mandatory AIDS testing, endorse additional domestic spending and support defense cuts. Indeed, on a number of issues, upper-class white voters were more liberal than Hispanic and black Democrats—for instance, on banning abortions (compared to Hispanics), defense cuts, support for the INF, and favoring a tax hike.

It is not surprising therefore that well-educated upper class white Democrats were attracted to Jackson's candidacy. When asked to name the qualities that led them to vote the way they did on Super Tuesday, the leading answer for Jackson whites was Jackson's "vision" or "convictions" (67 percent). By comparison, blacks were most likely to mention empathy (49 percent)—that he "understood their problems." Asked to name the issues that were most important to their decisions, white Jackson supporters were more likely than black Jackson supporters to mention defense and morality in government while Jackson blacks were more likely to say social security. The vast

majority of Jackson whites (72 percent) and Jackson blacks (89 percent) thought that the government was responsible for providing jobs and a decent standard of living, but only 33 percent of the Jackson whites thought that the government should support traditional values as compared with 57 percent of Jackson blacks. As a corollary, 46 percent of Jackson whites thought that religion had too much influence over politics as compared to 11 percent of Jackson blacks. White and black Jackson supporters were united by economic liberalism, but separated by social conservatism and their relative levels of interest in foreign policy (e.g., Jackson whites were almost twice as likely to favor defense cuts and four times more likely to support the INF treaty). The Jackson campaign was, as we said before, as much and perhaps more a marble cake coalition of ideological middle class whites with predominantly non-middle class blacks as it was a Rainbow coalition of economically disadvantaged groups.

Still the Rainbow aspect of Jackson's candidacy cannot be totally dismissed since, for instance, Jackson won a slightly higher share of the Hispanic vote than he did the white. According to the Times data, he took about 29 percent of the Mexican-American vote in the South and 23 percent in Illinois. He did even better with the predominantly Puerto Rican Hispanics in New York, getting almost 64 percent of the vote there. The coefficients in the relevant equations also show that, controlling for all other factors, Hispanics were more inclined than whites toward Jackson, but a moderate Catholic Hispanic in New York was still more likely to support Dukakis than Jackson. Nonetheless, given the low socio-economic status of the Hispanic community in the U.S. and the success of Hispanic-Black coalitions in Chicago, Boston and Los Angeles, Jackson could have expected to have done better. But once again, as in 1984, the majority of Hispanics did not embrace his candidacy. Such idiosyncratic factors as Dukakis's ability to speak Spanish cannot be discounted as an explanation for his support among Hispanics (although fewer than five percent of Hispanics in California regarded Dukakis as an ethnic candidate). However, religion may have been another cause. From the first primaries in Iowa and New Hampshire, Dukakis ran very well with Catholics, especially as compared to Jackson. He got the largest share of the Catholic vote in every state the LA Times polled except Illinois, and in every state the logit estimates indicate Catholicism as leading to greater support for Dukakis. Since most Hispanics are Catholic, one reason that Hispanics did not rally to the Jackson cause may have been a religious unease about voting for a Protestant minister. (One notices a similar, though less pronounced, reluctance of Catholics to support Pat Robertson in the Republican primaries.)

Ideology and issues may also have played a role in generating Hispanic support for Dukakis since Hispanics are less likely than either white or black Democrats to call themselves liberals and, as we have found, ideology played a major role in electoral choice during the 1988 primaries. Hispanics, were also less attuned to the environmental and foreign policy themes that attracted many left wing, affluent whites to Jackson.

In the end, the boost from Super Tuesday and the successes in March gave way to decisive defeats for Jackson in Wisconsin, New York and Pennsylvania. The New York primary especially finished Jackson's chances in a bitter and racially divided contest. If regionalism slowed Dukakis's

progress toward the nomination, racial tension and strategic behavior on the part of Jews, moderates and conservatives in New York and Pennsylvania accelerated it. Voters in all these groups apparently concluded on the basis of Gore's inability to defeat Dukakis in Florida and Texas and to register any significant victories outside the south that Dukakis was the only acceptable candidate with a chance to win. Faced with the prospect of a good showing by their least preferred alternative, they acted in a self-consciously and openly strategic way, abandoning Gore for the next most desirable candidate—Dukakis.

There are several pieces of evidence on this point in the LA Times data. In both the New York and Pennsylvania primaries, voters were asked in the exit poll to explain their choices. In New York, 14 percent said that they were voting primarily against another candidate and 11 percent indicated that they were casting their ballots in a manner that did not waste their votes. Seventy-seven percent of the former and 64 percent of the latter voted for Dukakis over Jackson and Gore. By comparison, Dukakis only received 36 percent of the vote from those who said they were willing to "express their feelings" and 42 percent from those who were voting for "the best man for the job." Also in New York, 54 percent of those sampled agreed with the statement that casting a ballot for Gore was a wasted vote. Of these, not too surprisingly, Dukakis won 62 percent of the votes and Gore only 5 percent. Gore received his strongest support among conservatives, but moderates voted overwhelmingly for Dukakis.

The same pattern was repeated in Pennsylvania. Overall, 12 percent of those voting said that their main motivation was to vote against the other (of whom 83 percent voted for Dukakis) and another 12 percent said that they were motivated by not wanting to waste their votes (of whom 76 percent voted for Dukakis). As in New York, a little over half (51 percent) thought that voting for Gore was equivalent to throwing away their vote and, of these, three quarters voted for Dukakis. Again, by comparison, Dukakis got 62 percent of the vote from those who voted to express their feelings and 64 percent of those who thought that their candidate was the best man for the job. Even in California, long after the race was decided, 10 percent of the voters indicated that they were motivated by an interest in not wasting their votes.

The two major categories of voters whose support swung to Dukakis in New York and Pennsylvania were non-liberals and Jews. In Iowa and New Hampshire, Dukakis had drawn fairly evenly from the "somewhat conservative", "somewhat liberal" and "moderate" voters, but his share of them almost doubled in New York and Pennsylvania, as is evident in Table 2a. In Pennsylvania, with Gore virtually eliminated by the results in New York, Dukakis received 75 percent of the moderate vote and 73 percent of the somewhat conservative vote. In contrast, Jackson's share of the very liberal vote does not shift very much after Super Tuesday.

The other critical group in these primaries was the Jews. A highly liberal group—in New York, for example, 22 percent of Jewish voters called themselves "very liberal" and 39 percent "somewhat liberal" — under most circumstances they would have been attracted to a liberal candidate. In Jackson's case, however, there was simply too much history of distrust, misstatement

and controversy. Making matters worse (although its impact on the election is unclear), Mayor Koch waded into the primary by endorsing Gore and advising Jews and other supporters of Israel that they would be "crazy" to vote for Jackson. Jackson himself observed that, "In New York, there has been more divisive language than in any other state or region."⁷

Evidence of Jewish-black tensions in New York is abundant and stark. Thirty nine percent of all Democratic voters and 79 percent of Jews thought that Jesse Jackson was anti-Semitic. Eighty-eight percent of Jews said that their sympathies in the Middle East lay with Israel as compared to 37 percent of the voters overall, 12 percent of the blacks and 25 percent of the Hispanics. Jackson received 71 percent of the vote of those who said their sympathies were with the Arabs, and 49 percent of those who said neither the Israelis or the Arabs. Many of the strategic considerations discussed earlier were even more evident in Jewish responses to these items. Compared to 44 percent of Democratic voters who thought that Jackson was unelectable in November, 74 percent of the Jewish voters thought so. Sixty-nine percent of Jews thought that a vote for Gore was wasted, and 46 percent said that Jackson should not be the Democratic party's nominee even if he won the most number of delegates in the primaries. Blacks felt equally embattled. Eighty-eight percent of Jackson voters felt there was an element of racism in voting against Jackson, a charge which many Jews resented.

Since many of these tensions had existed since at least 1984 and Jackson was already known to Jews, it is unlikely that Jackson ever had any chance of getting a large number of Jewish votes. In Florida and Illinois, Jews had voted for Dukakis and Simon overwhelmingly, and Jackson had received less than 10 percent of the Jewish vote—which is also what happened in New York and Pennsylvania. The main loser in the New York campaign was Gore who, but for the fear of Jackson, might have parlayed his pro-Israel voting record and moderate politics into a respectable challenge to Dukakis.

CONCLUSION: THE MYTH OF MOMENTUM?

Whither momentum? The conventional wisdom about presidential primaries is that victories in the early caucuses and primaries give a candidate a burst of media attention which, in turn, generates campaign contributions and additional exposure. A bandwagon is begun which can propel a previously unknown candidate—such as George McGovern or Jimmy Carter—to the nomination. Nineteen eighty-eight hardly fits this pattern. Robert Dole and Richard Gephardt won the Iowa caucuses handily, but it was the first, last, and only hurrah for their campaigns. Michael Dukakis, not too surprisingly, won neighboring New Hampshire, only to be beaten by Albert Gore (who sat out Iowa and New Hampshire) or Jesse Jackson in every southern state except Florida and Texas. One might attribute Dukakis's victories in those two states to momentum, but then how can one explain Jackson, Dukakis, and Gore all losing to Paul Simon in Illinois?

7. "The Air is Bitter to Buoyant as Voting Nears," Bernard Weintraub, *New York Times*, April 19, 1988.

We think an alternative explanation better accounts for the course of the 1988 primary campaign than conventional momentum theories and, possibly, for primaries in other years as well. The explanation centers on strategic voting. In two-candidate races, voters face a relatively simple decision: is one candidate preferable to the other? In multi-candidate races (as are most presidential primaries), the decision problem is considerably more complicated. Consider, for example, the situation in the 1988 New York Democratic primary. The field had, for all practical purposes, been reduced to Dukakis, Jackson, and Gore. However, most polls showed Jackson running close to Dukakis with Gore far behind. A Jackson victory appeared to be a real possibility. Many conservative and Jewish voters preferred Gore to Dukakis to Jackson. Their dilemma was obvious: voting for their most preferred candidate (Gore) might lead to the unthinkable, a Jackson victory. By and large, conservative voters abandoned Gore and swelled Dukakis's margin of victory.

The strategic considerations described above are not unique to the New York primary and, in our view, are pervasive in multi-candidate primaries. In general, it is an equilibrium strategy in a three candidate race for a voter to support the candidate he or she prefers among the two candidates who are most preferred by the remaining voters. That is, one counts the number of other voters who most prefer a particular candidate and eliminate from consideration the candidate preferred by the least number of voters. In New York, this was clearly Gore.

How can such strategic considerations account for the course of the 1988 presidential primary campaign? In our view, the effect of earlier primaries is not to create a bandwagon, but to help voters gauge the preferences of other voters. If two states are similar and one holds their primary before the other, voters in the second primary can interpret the outcome of the first primary as a sort of "straw poll" of voters in their own state to determine which candidates are likely to be in contention for a first place finish. This explains how the results of small, seemingly unimportant state primaries and caucuses at the beginning of the primary season can appear to have so much influence. A victory in Iowa or New Hampshire serves to identify which candidates will be viable in subsequent states.

If this logic is correct, why did Dole and Gephardt fail to gain any advantage from their victories in the Iowa caucuses? The answer is two-fold. First, the results in an earlier primary are informative only insofar as the states are similar. Iowa and New Hampshire are similar in many ways, but are in very different regions. The regional advantage of Dole and Gephardt made their victories in Iowa and New Hampshire less meaningful than, say, Jimmy Carter's strong showing there in 1976. Second, a victory in an earlier primary has strategic consequences only if that victory alters voters' perceptions of who the leading candidates are. Bush's finish in Iowa was indeed very poor and surprising, but it did not alter New Hampshire voters' perceptions that the Republican primaries were largely a Bush-Dole contest. If, on the other hand, New Hampshire voters had taken Pat Robertson's candidacy more seriously, they might have faced a Dole-Robertson choice rather than a Dole-Bush choice. In this case, Bush support in New Hampshire might have eroded greatly. But it was Dole's misfortune that a rather weak candidate like Robertson (instead of perhaps Kemp) was the most successful candidate on Bush's right.

The pattern throughout 1988 was for a candidate near the median (Bush and Dukakis) to face challenges on the left and right from more than one candidate on each side. In the Democratic primaries, Dukakis early on established himself as the most viable candidate of the middle. Jackson and Simon battled for supremacy on the left while Gore and Gephardt jockeyed on the right. Jackson, with a rock-solid constituency base in the black community, outlasted Simon, while Gore's strong showing on Super Tuesday ended Gephardt's chances. By the time the race had been winnowed to three candidates, however, Dukakis had a commanding delegate lead and was the clear frontrunner for the nomination. The strategic considerations outlined above then greatly benefitted Dukakis by squeezing out one of his remaining two opponents. On the Republican side, the same factors benefitted Bush. Dole was the clear alternative on the left, but Kemp and Robertson split the right. This made the race primarily a Bush-Dole affair that, by virtue of his position at the Republican median, Bush was guaranteed to win.

Table 1**Ideology of Voters in Caucuses and Primaries**

	Very liberal	Somewhat liberal	Middle-of-the-road	Somewhat conservative	Very conservative	Don't think of self that way	N
Iowa							
Democratic	10	31	32	19	2	6	1450
Republican	2	8	18	44	23	4	1470
New Hampshire							
Democratic	14	35	26	13	4	8	1699
Republican	2	8	19	42	22	6	1995
South*							
Democratic	10	23	27	21	8	11	4516
Republican	4	10	18	37	24	7	3132
Illinois							
Democratic	13	29	28	14	5	11	2002
Republican	4	13	28	33	15	7	1088
New York							
Democratic	18	30	25	10	4	12	2952
Pennsylvania							
Democratic	12	24	32	15	5	11	3432
California							
Democratic	15	31	26	14	3	11	2243

* Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas

Table 2a
Ideology and Voting in Democratic Primaries

	Very liberal	Somewhat liberal	Middle-of-the-road	Somewhat conservative	Very conservative
Iowa					
Dukakis	15	28	24	22	17
Jackson	27	12	8	8	21
Simon	21	27	24	18	7
Gephardt	15	18	29	33	41
Other	22	15	16	19	14
Total	100	100	101	100	100
N	(141)	(444)	(467)	(276)	(29)
New Hampshire					
Dukakis	36	35	34	32	10
Jackson	22	13	5	4	4
Gore	3	5	15	10	2
Simon	16	27	16	18	2
Gephardt	5	9	19	26	41
Other	20	11	12	11	41
Total	102	100	101	101	100
N	(233)	(595)	(449)	(220)	(68)
South					
Dukakis	24	35	30	22	16
Jackson	44	29	20	14	29
Gore	19	23	32	45	35
Gephardt	5	8	10	10	9
Other	8	6	8	9	10
Total	100	101	100	100	99
N	(463)	(1020)	(1235)	(960)	(347)
Illinois					
Dukakis	13	18	24	18	17
Jackson	56	30	20	23	46
Gore	2	4	4	10	5
Simon	26	45	49	42	28
Other	2	3	3	7	5
Total	99	100	100	100	101
N	(253)	(574)	(559)	(290)	(102)
New York					
Dukakis	36	56	56	56	30
Jackson	57	33	29	27	59
Gore	5	9	12	16	10
Other	2	2	3	1	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N	(536)	(887)	(734)	(308)	(123)

	Very liberal	Somewhat liberal	Middle-of-the-road	Somewhat conservative	Very conservative
Pennsylvania					
Dukakis	55	64	76	74	71
Jackson	42	32	19	19	24
Other	3	4	5	8	5
Total	100	100	100	101	100
N	(419)	(834)	(1088)	(530)	(187)
California					
Dukakis	28	50	64	60	39
Jackson	69	46	32	32	55
Other	3	5	4	9	5
Total	100	101	100	101	99
N	(341)	(688)	(580)	(326)	(69)

Table 2b
Ideology and Voting in Republican Primaries

	Very liberal	Somewhat liberal	Middle-of-the-road	Somewhat conservative	Very conservative
Iowa					
Bush	21	22	20	19	11
Dole	50	54	47	37	16
Robertson	15	14	15	21	46
Kemp	9	6	6	12	18
Other	6	4	12	10	8
Total	101	100	100	99	99
N	(34)	(115)	(272)	(645)	(344)
New Hampshire					
Bush	26	38	41	40	28
Dole	50	43	34	27	14
Robertson	16	3	7	8	20
Kemp	6	6	10	11	25
Other	2	9	8	14	12
Total	100	99	100	100	99
N	(50)	(162)	(383)	(836)	(447)
South					
Bush	57	54	56	54	46
Dole	26	33	29	26	15
Robertson	10	7	9	14	29
Kemp	5	3	4	5	9
Other	2	4	2	1	1
Total	100	101	100	100	100
N	(129)	(300)	(573)	(1154)	(767)
Illinois					
Bush	54	52	42	52	48
Dole	24	38	49	41	29
Robertson	13	5	6	6	19
Kemp	9	1	1	1	2
Other	0	3	2	0	2
Total	100	99	100	100	100
N	(46)	(139)	(307)	(360)	(160)

Table 3

IMPACT OF ISSUES ON CHOICE

Illinois

	Abortion Ban	AIDS Testing	Contra Aid	Defense Cuts	More Domestic Spending	INF Treaty	Restrict Imports	Oil Tax	Tax Hike
Dukakis	14	34	13	43	38	33	34	16	17
Jackson	16	33	7	41	36	18	20	11	12
Simon	17	32	12	41	39	28	30	15	41
Gore	24	38	24	21	31	35	29	14	15
Bush	24	40	30	22	23	29	32	14	12
Dole	21	36	23	33	25	29	32	16	16
Robertson	72	54	39	19	21	13	38	14	11
WW Dems	14	30	13	57	50	41	30	15	27
WB Dems	21	41	11	37	38	25	39	19	14
Hisp Dems	22	43	11	40	48	18	20	15	12
Bl Dems	18	39	7	42	36	14	20	11	11
Republicans	28	43	32	26	23	30	34	17	14

New Hampshire

	Aid For Abortions	AIDS Testing	Contra Aid	Day- Care	Defense Cuts	More Domestic Spending	Budget Freeze
Dukakis	33	20	6	50	54	40	37
Jackson	47	12	4	69	78	56	31
Gore	22	22	21	43	53	36	47
Simon	44	14	3	57	70	40	32
Gephardt	13	30	15	28	37	25	41
Bush	19	33	47	25	21	19	51
Dole	21	22	28	31	38	19	61
Kemp	14	30	49	21	15	15	50
Robertson	3	44	51	20	21	15	47
WW Dem	43	19	9	57	65	47	39
WB Dem	23	25	8	45	49	38	38
Republicans	17	32	42	24	25	18	56

South

	Abortion Ban	AIDS Testing	Contra Aid	Defense Cuts	More Domestic Spending	INF Treaty	Restrict Imports	Oil Tax	Tax Hike
Dukakis	18	31	14	37	32	31	33	18	23
Gephardt	22	40	18	28	22	24	42	19	20
Gore	24	42	19	25	23	23	37	18	16
Jackson	16	31	7	36	33	17	22	11	15
Simon	14	33	13	45	35	39	40	19	24
Bush	29	46	42	14	14	28	33	17	13
Dole	25	37	31	23	19	30	36	19	21
Kemp	47	53	53	13	17	22	33	19	11
Robertson	74	58	45	14	13	14	37	18	8
WW Dems	18	35	14	44	36	35	35	21	29
WB Dems	25	40	14	30	27	21	40	15	16
Hisp Dems	29	36	16	29	34	17	29	15	14
Bl Dems	20	38	7	33	33	12	23	10	13
Republicans	37	48	42	17	16	27	36	18	15

Note: Entries are % of candidate's voters who support each measure

Table 4
Percentage of Voters Mentioning Candidates' Region

	Iowa	New Hampshire	South	Illinois
<i>Democratic</i>				
Dukakis	1	30	1	2
Jackson	1	0	5	4
Gore	0	1	18	1
Simon	23	0	1	16
Gephardt	46	1	4	15
<i>Republican</i>				
Bush	2	1	1	1
Dole	38	2	2	11
Robertson	0	0	1	3
Kemp	2	0	2	0

Appendix 1

IOWA

	Dole	Robertson	Kemp
Constant	.901 (.217)	-1.621 (.218)	-.035 (.277)
Liberal	.301 (.237)	-1.219 (.314)	-1.283 (.418)
Moderate	.213 (.191)	-.933 (.234)	-.921 (.297)
White Collar	-.206 (.190)	-.835 (.197)	-.405 (.242)
College	-.070 (.180)	-.745 (.188)	.038 (.237)
Union	-.244 (.196)	.083 (.209)	-.214 (.262)
Catholic	.043 (.196)	-.379 (.228)	.193 (.249)
Female	.067 (.160)	.314 (.174)	.387 (.207)
Log Likelihood -1621 <i>n</i> 1316			

Note: Base category for Democratic equations is vote for Dukakis. Only candidates with significant fractions of the vote are included.

Base category for Republican equations is vote for Bush. No equations estimated after SuperTuesday, since the Los Angeles Times stopped polling Republicans at that point.

IOWA – II

	Jackson	Simon	Gephardt
Constant	-1.123 (.350)	-.339 (.279)	1.129 (.251)
Liberal	.122 (.263)	.188 (.225)	-.584 (.221)
Moderate	-.603 (.304)	.118 (.235)	-.156 (.218)
White Collar	.516 (.247)	.151 (.190)	-.599 (.186)
College	.368 (.244)	.424 (.192)	-.451 (.185)
Female	-.370 (.211)	-.479 (.169)	-.526 (.172)
Union	.308 (.224)	.323 (.180)	.024 (.186)
Catholic	-1.004 (.271)	-.337 (.183)	-.373 (.189)
Fundamental	.881 (.233)	-.011 (.209)	-.067 (.207)
Farmer	-.170 (.357)	.601 (.249)	.538 (.242)
Log Likelihood	-1289		
<i>n</i>	1025		

NEW HAMPSHIRE

	Jackson	Simon	Gephardt
Constant	-1.483 (0.321)	-1.000 (0.251)	-0.101 (0.226)
Liberal	0.690 (0.268)	0.304 (0.206)	-1.188 (0.211)
Moderate	-0.331 (0.339)	0.008 (0.231)	-0.345 (0.207)
White Collar	-0.372 (0.214)	0.224 (0.181)	-0.363 (0.186)
College	0.568 (0.256)	0.426 (0.198)	0.008 (0.196)
Female	-0.003 (0.188)	-0.345 (0.149)	-0.316 (0.167)
Catholic	-0.543 (0.191)	-0.110 (0.150)	0.003 (0.169)
Union	0.104 (0.209)	0.007 (0.167)	0.531 (0.175)
Log Likelihood	-1457		
<i>n</i>	1186		

SOUTH – SUPERTUESDAY

	Jackson	Gore
Constant	-1.501 (.180)	1.052 (.110)
Liberal	.449 (.154)	-.822 (.111)
Moderate	-.118 (.171)	-.464 (.108)
White Collar	-.112 (.143)	-.035 (.100)
College	.561 (.158)	-.287 (.103)
Union	.021 (.143)	.279 (.101)
Catholic	-.427 (.169)	-1.201 (.132)
Jew	-1.361 (.358)	-2.203 (.327)
Female	-.354 (.127)	-.219 (.089)
Black	2.432 (.117)	-.496 (.169)
Hispanic	.797 (.288)	-1.371 (.364)
Log Likelihood	-2429	
<i>n</i>	3319	

NEW YORK

	<u>Jackson</u>	<u>Gore</u>
Constant	-1.137 (0.204)	-0.972 (0.238)
Liberal	0.190 (0.146)	-0.766 (0.175)
Moderate	-0.635 (0.174)	-0.313 (0.177)
White Collar	0.005 (0.134)	0.005 (0.165)
College	0.574 (0.147)	0.008 (0.170)
Union	0.004 (0.117)	-0.250 (0.145)
Catholic	-0.445 (0.131)	-0.169 (0.178)
Female	-0.009 (0.116)	-0.007 (0.139)
Black	4.409 (0.244)	-0.003 (0.513)
Hispanic	1.732 (0.178)	-0.789 (0.408)
Jew	-1.568 (0.181)	-0.200 (0.192)
Log Likelihood	-1683	
<i>n</i>	2603	

PENNSYLVANIA

Jackson

	All Voters	Whites Only
Constant	-1.913 (0.170)	-2.157 (0.187)
Liberal	0.710 (0.147)	0.805 (0.161)
Moderate	0.169 (0.159)	0.248 (0.174)
White Collar	0.126 (0.131)	0.205 (0.140)
College	0.581 (0.132)	0.668 (0.141)
Union	-0.219 (0.121)	-0.195 (0.130)
Catholic	-0.430 (0.120)	-0.314 (0.126)
Female	-0.259 (0.116)	-0.234 (0.124)
Black	4.743 (0.242)	—
Hispanic	0.484 (0.306)	—
Jews	-1.652 (0.319)	-1.760 (0.344)
Log Likelihood	-1005.4	-862.6
<i>n</i>	2723	2151

CALIFORNIA

Jackson

	<u>All Voters</u>	<u>Whites Only</u>
Constant	-1.532 (0.179)	-1.684 (0.212)
Liberal	0.925 (0.148)	0.917 (0.178)
Moderate	-0.234 (0.168)	-0.187 (0.207)
White Collar	-0.003 (0.128)	-0.004 (0.150)
College	0.623 (0.142)	0.817 (0.176)
Catholic	-0.007 (0.131)	-0.003 (0.146)
Female	-0.155 (0.174)	-0.169 (0.132)
Jew	-0.789 (0.224)	-0.806 (0.229)
Black	4.108 (0.260)	—
Hispanic	0.897 (0.179)	—
Asian	0.557	—
<hr/>		
Log Likelihood	-934.9	-692.2
<i>n</i>	1877	1206

IOWA

	<u>Dole</u>	<u>Robertson</u>	<u>Kemp</u>
Constant	.901 (.217)	-1.621 (.218)	-.035 (.277)
Liberal	.301 (.237)	-1.219 (.314)	-1.283 (.418)
Moderate	.213 (.191)	-.933 (.234)	-.921 (.297)
White Collar	-.206 (.190)	-.835 (.197)	-.405 (.242)
College	-.070 (.180)	-.745 (.188)	.038 (.237)
Union	-.244 (.196)	.083 (.209)	-.214 (.262)
Catholic	.043 (.196)	-.379 (.228)	.193 (.249)
Female	.067 (.160)	.314 (.174)	.387 (.207)
Log Likelihood <i>n</i>	-1621 1316		

IOWA II

	<u>Dole</u>	<u>Robertson</u>	<u>Kemp</u>
Constant	.517 (.248)	-.574 (.310)	-.936 (.338)
Liberal	.331 (.248)	-.997 (.357)	-1.086 (.449)
Moderate	.258 (.201)	-.599 (.271)	-.757 (.320)
White Collar	-.111 (.204)	-.743 (.229)	-.318 (.265)
College	.050 (.187)	-.743 (.216)	.124 (.254)
Female	.098 (.169)	.130 (.199)	.342 (.222)
Union	-.304 (.207)	-.001 (.241)	-.278 (.281)
Catholic	.223 (.213)	.695 (.279)	.739 (.279)
Fundamental	.346 (.182)	3.193 (.249)	1.390 (.238)
Farmer	.561 (.231)	-.199 (.282)	.207 (.313)
Log Likelihood	-1358		
<i>n</i>	1236		

NEW HAMPSHIRE

	Dole	Robertson	Kemp
Constant	-0.522 (0.162)	-0.532 (0.198)	-0.680 (0.193)
Liberal	0.627 (0.177)	-0.954 (0.341)	-1.111 (0.327)
Moderate	0.205 (0.144)	-1.028 (0.254)	-0.755 (0.214)
White Collar	-0.002 (0.141)	-0.547 (0.184)	-0.276 (0.175)
College	0.189 (0.142)	-0.365 (0.185)	0.006 (0.178)
Female	-0.001 (0.119)	0.396 (0.167)	-0.142 (0.154)
Catholic	0.010 (0.125)	-0.195 (0.179)	0.291 (0.155)
Union	0.251 (0.157)	0.002 (0.232)	0.429 (0.196)
Log Likelihood	-2007		
<i>n</i>	1631		

SOUTH – SUPERTUESDAY

	Dole	Robertson
Constant	-1.147 (.119)	-.807 (.128)
Liberal	.280 (.130)	-.970 (.206)
Moderate	.204 (.117)	-.769 (.167)
White Collar	.237 (.106)	-.027 (.122)
College	.172 (.108)	-.057 (.124)
Union	.029 (.113)	-.322 (.147)
Catholic	-.262 (.134)	-.463 (.173)
Female	.193 (.093)	.068 (.110)
Log Likelihood	-2524	
<i>n</i>	2616	

Appendix 2

COMBINED ESTIMATIONS (All States)

One Jackson	-1.80	(.07)
One Gore	-.02	(.07)
One Simon	-.26	(.11)
One Gephardt	-.11	(.11)
Region	.60	(.03)
Black Jackson	4.03	(.10)
Black Gore	.19	(.19)
Black Simon	-.82	(.28)
Black Gephardt	1.69	(.23)
Hispanic Jackson	1.30	(.11)
Hispanic Gore	-1.64	(.25)
Hispanic Simon	.94	(.32)
Hispanic Gephardt	-1.23	(.43)
Liberal Jackson	.46	(.07)
Liberal Gore	-1.01	(.08)
Liberal Simon	.22	(.11)
Liberal Gephardt	-.98	(.13)
Moderate Jackson	-.24	(.08)
Moderate Gore	-.52	(.08)
Moderate Simon	.06	(.12)
Moderate Gephardt	-.32	(.13)
WC Jackson	.17	(.06)
WC Gore	-.26	(.07)
WC Simon	.14	(.09)
WC Gephardt	-.32	(.11)
Union Jackson	.01	(.06)
Union Gore	-.05	(.07)
Union Simon	.16	(.09)
Union Gephardt	.36	(.11)

Log Likelihood -9484

n 12365