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Dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information

Riezman, Raymond (1991) Dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information. Journal of International Economics, 30 (3-4). pp. 267-283. ISSN 0022-1996. doi:10.1016/0022-1996(91)90022-X.

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Recent developments in dynamic game theory are applied to determine when two countries can sustain freer trade given that they determine trade policies non-cooperatively. Countries know their own level of protection, but not the other country's level of protection. Using import trigger strategies, cooperation (in the form of low tariffs) can be supported, although there are periodic reversionary (high tariff) episodes. However, if terms of trade trigger strategies are used, cooperation does not occur.

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Additional Information:© 1991 Elsevier B.V. Received June 1989, revised version received September 1990. I thank Pat Conway, Russell Cooper, Avinash Dixit, James Friedman, Howard Gruenspecht, John Kennan, Ramon Marimon, Doug McManus, Roger Myerson, Rob Porter, Jennifer Reinganum, participants at the Mid-West International Economics Group meetings, the University of Western Ontario, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.
Issue or Number:3-4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-074249890
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Official Citation:Raymond Riezman, Dynamic tariffs with asymmetric information, Journal of International Economics, Volume 30, Issue 3, 1991, Pages 267-283, ISSN 0022-1996, (
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81173
Deposited By: Ruth Sustaita
Deposited On:06 Sep 2017 17:22
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:41

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