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Incentives and a Process Converging to the Core of a Public Goods Economy

Chander, Parkash (1988) Incentives and a Process Converging to the Core of a Public Goods Economy. Social Science Working Paper, 677. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-140940957

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Abstract

The paper considers economies involving one public good, one private good, and constant returns to scale. It is shown that the process proposed earlier in Chander (1983, 1987a, and 1987b) always converges to an allocation which is in the core of the economy. This is then interpreted as an incentive property of the process and it is shown that there exists no process which always converges to the core and in which truth-telling constitutes a dominance equilibrium of the 'local incentive game'.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:I would like to thank Jacques Dreze and Henry Tulkens for their helpful suggestions. Thanks are also due to Jean-Jacques Laffont for his comments. I have also benefited from a presentation at the Caltech Workshop.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-140940957
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-140940957
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81198
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:06 Sep 2017 21:44
Last Modified:06 Sep 2017 21:44

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