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Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions

Forsythe, Robert and Isaac, R. Mark and Palfrey, Thomas R. (1987) Theories and Tests of Blind Bidding in Sealed-bid Auctions. Social Science Working Paper, 670. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:Published as Forsythe, Robert, R. Mark Isaac, and Thomas R. Palfrey. "Theories and tests of" blind bidding" in sealed-bid auctions." The Rand Journal of Economics (1989): 214-238.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:670
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170906-154413142
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81219
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:08 Sep 2017 20:55
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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