CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signalling Equilibrium

Green, Jerry and Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1988) Competition on Many Fronts: A Stackelberg Signalling Equilibrium. Social Science Working Paper, 664. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-142614953

[img] PDF (sswp 664 - Jan. 1988) - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.

818Kb

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-142614953

Abstract

A single economic agent controls a variety of activities. Each activity is associated with a privately observed piece of information. The information is relevant to the actions he will take in this activity, and to the vulnerability of this activity to attack by another agent. Actions should be chosen so as partially to hide the private information, as well as to be efficient in the productive sense. This paper gives a characterization of the optimal association of actions to activities based on the private information available. Some applications are discussed.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-084200678Related ItemPublished Version
Alternate Title:Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium
Additional Information:Revised: Original dated to 1986. Support from the National Science Foundation, grant numbers IST-8310118 and IST-8507291 and Commissariat du Plan is gratefully acknowledged. We thank the referees for their helpful and detailed comments. Published as Green, Jerry, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. "Competition on many fronts: a Stackelberg signaling equilibrium." Games and Economic Behavior 2, no. 3 (1990): 247-272.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFIST-8310118
NSFIST-8507291
Commissariat du PlanUNSPECIFIED
Subject Keywords:x
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-142614953
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-142614953
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81245
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:08 Sep 2017 20:33
Last Modified:12 Sep 2017 18:37

Repository Staff Only: item control page