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Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effect of Incomplete Information and Altruism

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1987) Private Incentives in Social Dilemmas: The Effect of Incomplete Information and Altruism. Social Science Working Paper, 659. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-151800608

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the provision of discrete public goods when individuals have altruistic preferences which others do not precisely know. The problem is formulated and solved as a Bayesian game. In contrast to standard social psychological approaches, based on such natural language terms as greed, fear, and trust, the Bayesian approach provides a rigorous mathematical treatment of social participation. This theory is shown to make strong testable predictions that can integrate data collected across a wide variety of natural and experimental settings. The al truism model is shown to be supported by existing experimental data on binary voluntary contribution games.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160303-102157237Related ItemPublished Version
ORCID:
AuthorORCID
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:Published as Palfrey, Thomas R. and Rosenthal, Howard (1988) Private incentives in social dilemmas: The effects of incomplete information and altruism. Journal of Public Economics, 35 (3). pp. 309-332.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:659
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-151800608
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-151800608
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81250
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:08 Sep 2017 20:21
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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