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Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1987) Mechanism Design with Incomplete Information: A Solution to the Implementation Problem. Social Science Working Paper, 658. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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The main result of this paper is that the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design can be avoided in private value models if agents do not use weakly dominated strategies in equilibrium. We show that in such settings, any incentive compatible allocation can be made the unique equilibrium outcome to a mechanism. We derive a general necessary condition for unique implementation which implies that the positive result for private value models applies with considerably less generality to common value settings and to situations in which an agent's information does not index the agent's preferences.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:Published as Palfrey, Thomas R., and Howard Rosenthal. "Private incentives in social dilemmas: The effects of incomplete information and altruism." Journal of Public Economics 35, no. 3 (1988): 309-332.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:658
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170907-152638547
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81251
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:08 Sep 2017 20:10
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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