CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1986) Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies. Social Science Working Paper, 649. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-151520400

[img] PDF (sswp 649 - Dec. 1986) - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.

805Kb

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-151520400

Abstract

This paper provides a characterization of fully implementable outcomes using undominated Nash equilibrium, i.e. a Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a weakly dominated strategy. The analysis is conducted in general domains in which agents have complete information. Our main result is that with at least three agents any social choice function or correspondence obeying the usual no veto power condition is implementable unless some players are completely indifferent over all possible outcomes. This result is contrasted with the more restrictive implementation findings with either (unrefined) Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect equilibrium.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160307-145552688Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:We wish to thank the National Science Foundation for financial support. Profess or Palfrey also thanks the Exxon Educational Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for supporting his fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. We have benefited from comments by seminar participants at Carnegie-Mellon, Penn, Princeton, Stanford, SUNY-Buffalo, and USC, and from discussions with John Moore.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFUNSPECIFIED
Exxon Educational FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Alfred P. Sloan FoundationUNSPECIFIED
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-151520400
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-151520400
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81273
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:11 Sep 2017 20:34
Last Modified:11 Sep 2017 20:34

Repository Staff Only: item control page