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Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes

Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey S. (1987) Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes. Social Science Working Paper, 643. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper develops a multi-stage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a non-cooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
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Additional Information:Revised. Original dated to March 1987. Published as Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks. "Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes." American Political Science Review 82, no. 2 (1988): 405-422.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:643
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170908-170013615
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81279
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:11 Sep 2017 22:43
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:41

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