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Sincere Voting in Models of Legislative Elections

Austen-Smith, David (1987) Sincere Voting in Models of Legislative Elections. Social Science Working Paper, 637. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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An assumption of sincere voting for one's most preferred candidate is frequently invoked in models of electoral competition in which the elected legislature consists of more than a single candidate or party. Voters, however, have preferences over policy outcomes--which are determined by the ex post elected legislature--and not over candidates per se. This observation provokes the following question. For what methods of translating election results into legislative policy outcomes is sincere voting rational in the legislative election? This paper provides the answer. One of the principal implications is that for sincerity to be rational, there necessarily exists a candidate for office whose electoral platform is the final legislative outcome, whether or not that candidate is elected to the legislature.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
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Additional Information:Much of this paper is a result of the efforts of John Ledyard to understand what I was trying to say about the problem. I am extremely grateful for his help, and for his insistence that I look for a theorem and not simply a set of examples. I am also grateful to Kim Border for providing a proof for one of the results. Despite their input, I retain all responsibility for any remaining errors and ambiguities. Published as Austen-Smith, David. "Sincere voting in models of legislative elections." Social Choice and Welfare 6.4 (1989): 287-299.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:637
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170911-142742977
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81310
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:11 Sep 2017 23:52
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:41

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