CaltechAUTHORS
  A Caltech Library Service

Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas

Austen-Smith, David (1987) Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas. Social Science Working Paper, 630. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170911-154858256

[img] PDF (sswp 630 - Feb. 1987) - Submitted Version
See Usage Policy.

497kB

Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170911-154858256

Abstract

The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed. This is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences need to be known; and these are typically private data. In this note it is shown that, under complete information, if decision-making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171110-134842995Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:I am grateful to Richard McKelvey and to the referees for comments on an earlier version of this paper. They bear no responsibility for any remaining shortcomings. This research is supported by NSF grant SES-8600965. Published as Austen-Smith, David. "Sophisticated sincerity: voting over endogenous agendas." American Political Science Review 81.4 (1987): 1323-1330.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-8600965
Subject Keywords:Voting paradox, Legislators, Voting, Majority voting, Voting behavior, Congressional voting, Logical theorems, Decision making, Committees
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:630
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170911-154858256
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170911-154858256
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81328
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:11 Sep 2017 23:42
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:41

Repository Staff Only: item control page