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On Bayesian Implementable Allocations

Palfrey, Thomas R. and Srivastava, Sanjay (1986) On Bayesian Implementable Allocations. Social Science Working Paper, 624. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This paper identifies several social choice correspondences which are and are not fully implementable in economic environments when agents are incompletely informed about the environment. We show that in contrast to results in the case of complete information, neither efficient allocations nor core allocations define implementable social choice correspondences. We also identify conditions under which the Rational Expectations Equilibrium correspondence is implementable. We extend the concepts of fair allocations and Lindahl allocations to economies with incomplete information, and show that envy-free allocations and Lindahl allocations are implementable under some conditions while fair allocations are not.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Palfrey, Thomas R.0000-0003-0769-8109
Additional Information:We are thankful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under Grants IST-8406296, SES-8420486, and SES-8608118 and to the referees of this journal for helpful comments. We also wish to acknowledge several very helpful conversations with Andrew Postlewaite; in particular, example 4 derives October 1986 from a slightly different example he and David Schmeidler proposed. Published as Palfrey, Thomas R., and Sanjay Srivastava. "On Bayesian implementable allocations." The Review of Economic Studies 54.2 (1987): 193-208.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Subject Keywords:Information economy, Applied economics, Social choice, International economics, Allocative efficiency, Nash equilibrium, Public goods, Economic theory, Knowledge economy, Endowments
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:624
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-132538243
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81364
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Sep 2017 21:10
Last Modified:22 Nov 2019 09:58

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