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Sincere voting in models of legislative elections

Austen-Smith, D. (1989) Sincere voting in models of legislative elections. Social Choice and Welfare, 6 (4). pp. 287-299. ISSN 0176-1714. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-142107563

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Abstract

An assumption of sincere voting for one's most preferred candidate is frequently invoked in models of electoral competition in which the elected legislature consists of more than a single candidate or party. Similarly, such an assumption is more-or-less implicit in many normative discussions of the relative merits of alternative methods for electing a representative assembly. Voters, however, have preferences over policy outcomes—which are determined by the ex post elected legislature—and not over candidates per se. This paper examines the extent to which the sincere voting assumption is legitimate in a wide class of strategic models of legislative elections. The finding is negative, and this has direct implications for the interpretation of conlusions drawn from models—formal or otherwise—which impose sincere voting as an assumption. This paper is a revised version of CalTech Social Science Working Paper #637, and was written while I was a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Much of the paper is a result of the efforts of John Ledyard to understand what I was trying to say about the problem. I am extremely grateful for his help, and for his insistence that I look for a theorem and not simply a set of examples. I am also grateful to Kim Border for providing the structure of a proof for one of the results. Despite their imput, I retain all responsibility for any remaining errors and ambiguities.


Item Type:Article
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https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00446986DOIArticle
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00446986PublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170911-142742977 Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1989 Springer-Verlag. This paper is a revised version of CalTech Social Science Working Paper #637, and was written while I was a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Much of the paper is a result of the efforts of John Ledyard to understand what I was trying to say about the problem. I am extremely grateful for his help, and for his insistence that I look for a theorem and not simply a set of examples. I am also grateful to Kim Border for providing the structure of a proof for one of the results. Despite their input, I retain all responsibility for any remaining errors and ambiguities.
Issue or Number:4
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-142107563
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-142107563
Official Citation:Austen-Smith, D. Soc Choice Welfare (1989) 6: 287. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00446986
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81376
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:12 Sep 2017 21:34
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:42

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