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Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments

Mayer, Wolfgang and Riezman, Raymond (1990) Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments. Economics and Politics, 2 (3). pp. 259-273. ISSN 0954-1985. https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-153636196

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Abstract

We analyze voter preferences for tariffs and production subsidies. The distribution of tax revenues argument shows that voters with high direct tax burdens prefer tariffs to subsidies. The uncertainty argument demonstrates that if actual tariff and subsidy rates are chosen from the set of individually optimal rates then the range of tariff rates is smaller than the range of subsidy rates. Thus, tariffs might be preferred even though they are less efficient. Finally, the large country argument shows that if a country is large then voters whose income shares decline with more protection prefer tariffs to subsidies.


Item Type:Article
Related URLs:
URLURL TypeDescription
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00033.xDOIArticle
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00033.x/abstractPublisherArticle
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170901-142822107Related ItemWorking Paper
Additional Information:© 1990 Wiley. Comments by Jagdish Bhagwati, Dani Rodrik, and participants in the Columbia Conference on Political Economy and International Economics, as well as by Costas Syropoulos and seminar participants at Pennsylvania State University and the University of Western Ontario are greatly appreciated.
Issue or Number:3
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-153636196
Persistent URL:https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170912-153636196
Official Citation:Mayer, W. and Riezman, R. (1990), VOTER PREFERENCES FOR TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS. Economics & Politics, 2: 259–273. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00033.x
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81388
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:15 Sep 2017 18:27
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:42

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