Banks, Jeffrey S. (1986) Liability Rules and Pretrial Settlement. Social Science Working Paper, 608. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-141634119
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Abstract
The effect of different liability rules on the pretrial behavior of litigants to a civil suit is analyzed. The interaction is modeled as a game of incomplete information, where both the plaintiff and the defendant know whether or not they were negligent in actions leading to the accident. Selection criteria are used to refine the set of sequential equilibria of the game.
| Item Type: | Report or Paper (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | I would like to thank participants in the Caltech Theory Workshop for helpful comments and suggestions. |
| Group: | Social Science Working Papers |
| Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper |
| Issue or Number: | 608 |
| Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-141634119 |
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-141634119 |
| Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. |
| ID Code: | 81420 |
| Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS |
| Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone |
| Deposited On: | 15 Sep 2017 18:15 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:42 |
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