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Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Gasmi, Farid (1986) Endogenous Agenda Formation in Three-Person Committees. Social Science Working Paper, 603. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-153417196

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Abstract

This paper analyzes a 3-person voting game in which two or three players have the ability to choose alternatives to be considered. Once the set of possible alternatives and the structure of the voting procedure are known, the players can solve for the outcome. Thus, the actual choice over outcomes takes place in the choice of alternatives to be voted on, i.e., the agenda. An equilibrium to this agenda-formation game is shown to exist under different assumptions about the information relative to the order of the players in the voting game. Further, this equilibrium is computed and found to possess certain features which are attractive from a normative point of view.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
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http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160525-100726111Related ItemPublished Version
Additional Information:Prepared for delivery at the 1985 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, the New Orleans Hilton, August 29-September 1, 1985. Copyright by the American Political Science Association. We would like to thank Richard McKelvey and Norman Schofield for valuable comments and suggestions. Published as Banks, Jeffrey S., and Farid Gasmi. "Endogenous agenda formation in three-person committees." Social Choice and Welfare 4.2 (1987): 133-152.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-153417196
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-153417196
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81426
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Sep 2017 18:05
Last Modified:15 Sep 2017 18:05

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