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Laboratory Experiments in Economics: The Implications of Posted-Price Institutions

Plott, Charles R. (1986) Laboratory Experiments in Economics: The Implications of Posted-Price Institutions. Social Science Working Paper, 597. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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A laboratory experimental methodology has been developing in economics in recent years. The nature of the methodology is to integrate clearly motivated but largely subjectively determined human decisions with the organizational features of markets. The article summarizes the nature of the incentive system and how market organization can be used as an independent variable. Initial basic research results that involved the assessment of the effects of posted price organization demonstrated that the effect of the institution is to raise prices and lower market efficiency. The existence of such effects and the close proximity of the laboratory posted price institution and rate posting institution required by the government in several industries has led to a series of policy related experiments. The results have also led to more basic research efforts on seemingly unrelated topics.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
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Additional Information:The financial support of the National Science Foundation and the Caltech Center for Enterprise and Public Policy is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Plott, Charles R. "Laboratory experiments in economics: The implications of posted-price institutions." Science 232 (1986): 732-739.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Caltech Center for Enterprise and Public PolicyUNSPECIFIED
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:597
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170913-164929717
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81431
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Sep 2017 17:55
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:42

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