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An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity

Banks, Jeffrey S. and Plott, Charles R. and Porter, David P. (1986) An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity. Social Science Working Paper, 595. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-133142840

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Abstract

The paper reports on an experimental investigation of four methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an analysis of these results.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
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Additional Information:Funding provided by the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is gratefully acknowledged. The comments of Mark Olson (JPL) on the statistical analysis and his computer programming assistance are both acknowledged. Published as Banks, Jeffrey S. and Plott, Charles R. and Porter, David P. (1988) An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms. Review of Economic Studies, 55 (2). pp. 301-322.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-133142840
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-133142840
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81448
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Sep 2017 17:44
Last Modified:15 Sep 2017 17:44

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