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Political Power in the International Coffee Organization: A Research Note

Bates, Robert H. and Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald (1985) Political Power in the International Coffee Organization: A Research Note. Social Science Working Paper, 687. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-152422470

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Abstract

In recent decades, international commodity agreements have been proposed as a way of promoting “development." Behrman, McNicol and others have analyzed them from a purely economic point of view. Fisher, Krasner, and others have adopted a more political perspective. In this article, we seek to advance the political analysis of such agreements. We do so by studying the allocation of export entitlements in the International Coffee Organization (ICO). In the ICO, as in other international organizations, political processes replace markets in the allocation of source resources. In the case of the ICO, allocational decisions are made by majority rule. Given the possibility of strategic behavior in such political environments, game theory should provide a useful set of tools for the analysis of such institutions. A particular interest of this article is the appropriateness of a specific solution concept--the Shapley value--to the analysis of politically contrived allocations under the ICO.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
Additional Information:Research for this paper was supported by the Center for the Study of Futures Markets at Columbia University and by the National Science Foundation (Grant No. SES-8216870).
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funders:
Funding AgencyGrant Number
NSFSES-8216870
Columbia UniversityUNSPECIFIED
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-152422470
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-152422470
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81461
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Sep 2017 17:29
Last Modified:15 Sep 2017 17:29

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