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Game Forms for Nash Implementation of General Social Choice Correspondences

McKelvey, Richard D. (1986) Game Forms for Nash Implementation of General Social Choice Correspondences. Social Science Working Paper, 579. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Several game forms are given for implementing general social choice correspondences (SCC's) which satisfy Haskin's conditions of monotonicity and No Veto Power. The game forms have smaller strategy spaces than those used in previously discovered mechanisms: the strategy for an individual consists of an alternative, two subsets (of alternatives), and a player number. For certain types of economic and political SCC's, including a-majority rule, the Walrasian, and Lindahl correspondence, the strategy space reduces to an alternative and a vector, where the number of components of the vector is at most twice the dimension of the alternative space.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Revised. Original dated to August 1985. This paper was inspired by Tatsuyoshi Saijo's dissertation. I am greatly indebted to Kim Border, Leo Hurwicz, and Tatsuyoshi Saijo for some very helpful discussions. I acknowledge support of NSF grant No. SES-8208184. Published as McKelvey, Richard D. "Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences." Social Choice and Welfare 6.2 (1989): 139-156.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:579
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81490
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Sep 2017 21:11
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:43

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