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Econometric Modeling of a Stackelberg Game with an Application to Labor Force Participation

Bjorn, Paul A. and Vuong, Quang H. (1985) Econometric Modeling of a Stackelberg Game with an Application to Labor Force Participation. Social Science Working Paper, 577. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Following Bjorn and Vuong (1984), a model for dummy endogenous variables is derived from a game theoretic framework where the equilibrium concept used is that of Stackelberg. A distinctive feature of our model is that it contains as a special case the usual recursive model for discrete endogenous variables [see e.g., Maddala and Lee (1976)]. A structural interpretation of this latter model can then be given in terms of a Stackelberg game in which the leader is indifferent to the follower's action. Finally, the model is applied to a study of husband/wife labor force participation.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
Additional Information:This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES-8410593. We are indebted to D. Lien and D. Rivers for helpful comments, and to Boy Toy for moral support. Remaining errors are ours.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Funding AgencyGrant Number
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:577
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-135937957
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81492
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Sep 2017 21:19
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:43

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