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Reconciliation and the Size of the Budget

Ferejohn, John A. and Krehbiel, Keith (1985) Reconciliation and the Size of the Budget. Social Science Working Paper, 572. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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Reconciliation has become a regular feature of the congressional budget process. We address the question of whether or under what conditions the budget process with reconciliation (modeled as selection of the size of the budget first and its division second) produces smaller budgets than a piecemeal appropriations process in which the size of the budget is determined residually. The theoretical result is that reconciliation sometimes results in relatively large budgets. A testable implication of the theory is that given a choice of how stringently reconciliation is to be employed, congressmen will jointly consider preferences and the expected outcomes under the available institutional arrangements and select the arrangement (usually a rule) that yields the most favorable outcome. Empirical results from the budget process in the House from 1980-83 are generally supportive of the hypothesis of rational choice of institutional arrangements which is derived from the theory.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Discussion Paper)
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URLURL TypeDescription ItemPublished Version
Alternate Title:The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget
Additional Information:Published as Ferejohn, John, and Keith Krehbiel. "The budget process and the size of the budget." American Journal of Political Science (1987): 296-320.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Subject Keywords:Budget appropriations, Voting, Financial budgets, Budget line, United States federal budget, Political parties, Reconciliation, Military spending, Government spending
Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:572
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-145457916
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81497
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:15 Sep 2017 22:14
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:43

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