Krehbiel, Keith (1985) Unanimous Consent Agreements: Going along in the Senate. Social Science Working Paper, 568. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-153916911
![]() |
PDF (sswp 568 - May 1985)
- Submitted Version
See Usage Policy. 342kB |
Use this Persistent URL to link to this item: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-153916911
Abstract
In recent decades the U. S. Senate has made increasing use of complex unanimous consent agreements (UCAs) to set a time for a final vote on legislation (thereby precluding filibusters) and to specify, for example, who may offer what amendments. Because of the numerous dilatory tactics permitted in the absence of a UCA, controversial legislation is typically doomed unless a prior agreement has been reached. Thus the norm of consent to unanimous consent requests (UCRs) is puzzling. This paper addresses the puzzle with a decision-theoretic model of consent which yields what appears to be a rather stringent condition for objection to a UCR. Two actual cases of objection are analyzed and seem quite consistent with comparative statics results derived from the model. A concluding discussion considers UCAs as instances of endogenously chosen institutions which provide Senate leaders with opportunities to induce cooperative behavior.
Item Type: | Report or Paper (Working Paper) | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Related URLs: |
| ||||||
Additional Information: | I am grateful to Tom Gilligan and Doug Rivers for helpful conversations and comments, and to Walter Oleszek for bringing the cases to my attention. Published as Krehbiel, Keith. "Unanimous consent agreements: Going along in the Senate." The Journal of Politics 48.3 (1986): 541-564. | ||||||
Group: | Social Science Working Papers | ||||||
Subject Keywords: | Senators, Upper houses, United States Senate, Expected utility, Political science, Temptation, Wheat, Presidential debates, Congressional voting, Political debate | ||||||
Series Name: | Social Science Working Paper | ||||||
Issue or Number: | 568 | ||||||
Record Number: | CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-153916911 | ||||||
Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-153916911 | ||||||
Usage Policy: | No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided. | ||||||
ID Code: | 81502 | ||||||
Collection: | CaltechAUTHORS | ||||||
Deposited By: | Jacquelyn Bussone | ||||||
Deposited On: | 19 Sep 2017 21:49 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 03 Oct 2019 18:43 |
Repository Staff Only: item control page