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A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative Government

Bates, Robert H. and Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald (1985) A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative Government. Social Science Working Paper, 567. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished)

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This article proposes a model representing the relationship between economic actors and revenue seeking governments. Given a need for revenues, the model predicts the allocation of the new tax burden and patterns of control over public policy. The model is motivated by the history of the rise of parliaments in Western Europe. It is extended to urban and developmental politics. It is designed to employ the techniques of "neo-classical" economics to explore themes which have been developed most clearly in Marxist writings. Most importantly, the model suggests the way in which, given a need for revenues, specific fractions of the private sector can gain control over public policy. And it characterizes precisely the factors which yield differences in the ability of economic agents to employ the market to defect from the tax-levying state. The analysis thus gives insight into both the origins and the limitations of political democracy.

Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
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Additional Information:Research for this article was supported by The National Science Foundation (Grant no. SES82-16870). Our special thanks to Philip Hoffman. Published as Bates, Robert H., and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien. "A note on taxation, development, and representative government." Politics & Society 14.1 (1985): 53-70.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
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Series Name:Social Science Working Paper
Issue or Number:567
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-154757538
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Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81503
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:19 Sep 2017 21:22
Last Modified:03 Oct 2019 18:43

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