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Imperfect Information and the Tender Offer Auction

Schwartz, Alan (1985) Imperfect Information and the Tender Offer Auction. Social Science Working Paper, 566. California Institute of Technology , Pasadena, CA. (Unpublished) http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-155631380

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Abstract

Managers of companies for which takeover bids have been or are likely to be made--"targets"--engage in a variety of tactics designed to minimize the likelihood of a takeover or increase the price an acquirer must ultimately pay. The welfare effects of these tactics are in dispute. This paper considers one such tactic, the running of "auctions" by managers of a target after an initial bid has been made; an auction is held if, as is often the case, the target's managers can interest other companies in bidding. This paper argues that auctions reduce welfare because they dampen search for suboptimally run firms, and do not have a comparative advantage over unregulated markets in moving corporate assets to their highest valued uses. Further, the shareholders of targets do not have property rights to the gains from takeovers that auctions could be viewed as protecting, Hence, the law that now permits auctions to occur should be changed.


Item Type:Report or Paper (Working Paper)
Additional Information:Maurice Jones, Jr. Professor of Law, U. S. C. Law Center; Professor of Law and Social Science, California Institute of Technology. I am grateful to Jeff Strnad for extremely helpful suggestions. Richard Craswell, Michael Levine and Matthew Spitzer made useful comments on an earlier version of the model set out in Part IA, infra.
Group:Social Science Working Papers
Record Number:CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-155631380
Persistent URL:http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170915-155631380
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81504
Collection:CaltechAUTHORS
Deposited By: Jacquelyn Bussone
Deposited On:19 Sep 2017 21:20
Last Modified:21 Sep 2017 00:05

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