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Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences

McKelvey, R. D. (1989) Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences. Social Choice and Welfare, 6 (2). pp. 139-156. ISSN 0176-1714. doi:10.1007/BF00303168.

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Several game forms are given for Nash implementing general social choice correspondences (SCC's) which satisfy Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and No Veto Power. The game forms have smaller strategy spaces than those used in previously studied mechanisms: the strategy for an individual consists of an alternative, two subsets (of alternatives), and a player number. For certain types of economic and political SCC's, including α-majority rule, the Walrasian, and Lindahl correspondence, the strategy space reduces to an alternative and a vector, where the number of components of the vector is at most twice the dimension of the alternative space.

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Additional Information:© 1989 Springer-Verlag. Received: 01 May 1987; Accepted: 17 August 1988. This paper was inspired by Tatsuyoshi Saijo's dissertation. I am greatly indebted to Kim Border, Leo Hurwicz, and Tatsuyoshi Saijo for some very helpful discussions. I acknowledge support of NSF grant No. SES 8208184.
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Issue or Number:2
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Official Citation:McKelvey, R.D. Soc Choice Welfare (1989) 6: 139.
Usage Policy:No commercial reproduction, distribution, display or performance rights in this work are provided.
ID Code:81527
Deposited By: Tony Diaz
Deposited On:19 Sep 2017 17:23
Last Modified:15 Nov 2021 19:44

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